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I. INTRODUCTION
“As for other Americans, life for people with disabilities involves striving, 
working, taking risks, failing, teaming, and overcoming obstacles.”1  The 
ability to work is an essential part of the American experience.2 To guarantee
persons with disabilities a place in the American workforce,3 Congress
enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).4 
Yet, despite the ADA, mentally disabled individuals continue to endure
discrimination in employment.5  Studies show “that mental disabilities are 
1. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF 
FEDERAL LAWS AND PROGRAMS AFFECTING PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES—WITH LEGISLATIVE
RECOMMENDATIONS (1986), https://ncd.gov/publications/1986/February1986#5 [https://perma.cc/
JVD6-3YA6].
2. See id. (“We have all had the experience of seeking something that eludes us, of 
trying to reach a goal that seems to dance just out of reach.  Most of us have also had the rewarding 
experience of surmounting obstacles to achieve a goal or accomplish a task, succeeding 
even though someone else or even we ourselves doubted we could do it.”). 
3. Employers have a duty to offer reasonable accommodations for persons with 
disabilities so that they can take part in the American economy.  See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 
10 (1988).
4.  Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012). 
5. For example, in 2012, the “national unemployment rate for individuals receiving
public mental health services [was] approximately 80 percent.”  Mental Illness: NAMI Report 
Deplores 80 Percent Unemployment Rate; State Rates and Ranks Listed—Model Legislation 
Proposed, NAMI (Jan. 1, 2014), https://www.nami.org/Press-Media/Press-Releases/2014/ 
Mental-Illness-NAMI-Report-Deplores-80-Percent-Une [https://perma.cc/8EL7-M6AJ]. In 
California, that statistic was a staggering 90%.  Id.  These statistics are distressing because 
“[w]ork is tied to a person’s sense of identity, dignity and worth in our society.  Even 
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the most negatively perceived of all disabilities.”6  The “single biggest
issue” facing mentally disabled persons may be the ability to find and maintain 
employment.7 
The ADA has failed to create a clear way for employers to accommodate 
the needs of persons with mental disabilities.  Mental disabilities, as opposed 
to physical disabilities, are not always obvious.8  Uncertainty about whether
an individual has a mental disability creates a potential catch-22 of liability 
for employers.  If an employer fails to provide reasonable accommodations 
for a person with disabilities, an employer can be held liable under the ADA.9 
But if an employer initiates the process of providing an accommodation to an
employee, the employer could also face liability under the ADA for “regarding” 
that employee as “disabled.”10  As the number of mental diagnoses steadily
during the recession, the national unemployment rate paled next to what people in the
public mental health system routinely experience.  We must do better.” Id.  The Bureau
of Labor Statistics’ recent report on disability and employment statistics has neglected to
differentiate between physical and mental disabilities.  However, in total, a whopping 81%
of persons with disabilities were unemployed in 2019. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
USDL-20-0339, PERSONS WITH A DISABILITY: LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS—2019
(2020), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/disabl.htm [https://perma.cc/U7S8-R2TV]. 
 6.  Michael L. Perlin, “I Ain’t Gonna Work on Maggie’s Farm No More:” Institutional 
Segregation, Community Treatment, the ADA, and the Promise of Olmstead v. L.C., 17 T.M.
COOLEY L.REV. 53, 63 (2000).  Perception is critical because in many ways “perception functions 
as a source of knowledge,” which dictates social interaction.  Olli Lagerspetz, Studying
Perception, 83 PHILOSOPHY 193, 197 (2008). 
7. Wendy F. Hensel, People with Autism Spectrum Disorder in the Workplace: An 
Expanding Legal Frontier, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 73, 75 (2017) (quoting JUDITH
BARNARD ET AL., NAT’L AUTISTIC SOC’Y, IGNORED OR INELIGIBLE? THE REALITY FOR 
ADULTS WITH AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDERS 18 (2001)); see also Michael Edward Olsen,
Jr., Note, Disabled but Unqualified: The Essential Functions Requirement as a Proxy for 
the Ideal Worker Norm, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1485, 1488 (2015).  More than thirty years after 
passage of the ADA, only 19.3% of persons with disabilities are employed.  BUREAU OF
LAB. STAT., USDL-19-1735, THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION—SEPTEMBER 2019 tbl.A-6 (2019),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_10042019.pdf [https://perma.cc/97E9- 
NYV8]. This statistic is troubling because it may reflect a much deeper meaning: overall 
life satisfaction.  In other words, employment status is often used as a key indicator of life 
satisfaction. See generally Nabil Khattab & Steve Fenton, What Makes Young Adults 
Happy? Employment and Non-Work as Determinants of Life Satisfaction, 43 SOCIOLOGY
11 (2009) (studying the relationship between employment status and life satisfaction for
1100 individuals). 
8. See infra Section III.A. 
9. See infra Section II.C.1. 
10. See infra Section II.C.2. 
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increases,11 so too does potential liability for employers.12  The net result: the 
ADA will fail to protect persons with mental disabilities.13 
Employers need better tools than the ADA currently affords to help 
mentally disabled employees. The current approach to employer liability 
under the ADA presumes that employers intentionally discriminate or 
choose not to offer reasonable accommodations.  Further, the approach
disregards common sense notions that employers have the incentive to
ensure their entire workforce is successful—not just nondisabled employees.14 
Clarifying that employee disclosure of a disability would explicitly trigger
the employer’s duty to initiate the interactive process would encourage 
employers’ efforts to be proactive, benefitting both employers and mentally
disabled employees.15  Without changes to the ADA, persons with mental
disabilities will continue to miss out on the full benefits of employment.16 
Currently, Title I of the ADA imposes an affirmative duty on employers 
to engage in an “interactive process” with an employee to determine a
reasonable accommodation for the employee’s disability.17  This duty is
“triggered” when employers know or have a reason to know that an employee 
has a mental disability under the ADA and therefore needs a reasonable 
accommodation.18  An employee does not need to explicitly initiate the 
11. See infra Section III.A.1.
 12. See infra Section III.A.3.
 13. See infra Section III.A. 
14. Savvy employers aim to please their entire workforce because happy employees 
increase their productivity, which leads to more profits.  See Shawn Achor, The Happiness 
Dividend, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 23, 2011), https://hbr.org/2011/06/the-happiness-dividend 
[https://perma.cc/K59W-N72M] (“A decade of research proves that happiness raises nearly
every business and education outcome: raising sales by 37%, productivity by 31%, and 
accuracy on tasks by 19% . . . .”); Andrew Chamberlain, 6 Studies Showing Satisfied Employees 
Drive Business Results, GLASSDOOR (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.glassdoor.com/research/
satisfied-employees-drive-business-results/ [https://perma.cc/7843-5XRY] (“A powerful
lesson has emerged: Employees who are more satisfied—who feel like their job is rewarding, 
see an upward career path, and have great managers—clearly drive better financial performance 
for companies.”); Samuel Edwards, Examining the Relationship Between Workplace Satisfaction 
and Productivity, INC. (Oct. 29, 2015), https://www.inc.com/samuel-edwards/examining-
the-relationship-between-workplace-satisfaction-and-productivity.html [https://perma.cc/
Q65R-HCRN] (“[A]n increase in job satisfaction is directly related to a 6.6 percent increase in
productivity per hour.”). 
15. See infra Section IV.B.1.
 16. See infra Section III.B.
 17. See Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Therefore, 
we join explicitly with the vast majority of our sister circuits in holding that the interactive 
process is a mandatory rather than a permissive obligation on the part of employers under 
the ADA . . . .”), vacated, 535 U.S. 391 (2002)); see also Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 
184 F.3d 296, 315 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding employer’s duty is triggered “[o]nce the employer 
knows of the disability and the employee’s desire for accommodations . . . .”). 
18. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1171–72 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding 
employer’s duty to engage in interactive process is triggered when employee “convey[s] 
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process by disclosing a disability or requesting an accommodation.19 
Failure to initiate an interactive process can make an employer liable for
failure to accommodate.20 At the same time, an employer can also be held 
liable for discriminating against an employee if the employer “regards”
an employee as having a mental disability.21 
This leaves employers whipsawed: employers currently may face liability 
for failure to trigger the interactive process, or, if they do initiate an interactive
process, potential liability for regarding an employee as disabled.22 This
catch-22 needs to be addressed so that employers can provide their employees 
with effective accommodations.23  This might be accomplished through
agency guidance; however, although the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) has the power to enforce the ADA,24 courts treat its
guidelines as merely “persuasive” and not binding.25  Additionally, although
to the employer a desire to remain with the company despite his or her disability”); Bultemeyer
v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir. 1996) (“But properly participating in
the interactive process means that an employer cannot expect an employee to read its mind 
and know that he or she must specifically say ‘I want a reasonable accommodation,’ particularly 
when the employee has a mental illness.”); see also Small Employers and Reasonable
Accommodation, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/
facts/accommodation.html [https://perma.cc/K6ZE-CV8N] (last updated Dec. 20, 2017) 
(explaining that when requesting accommodation, “[a]n individual may use ‘plain English’ and 
need not mention the ADA or use the phrase ‘reasonable accommodation’”). 
19. See, e.g., Bultemeyer, 100 F.3d at 1285; Small Employers and Reasonable 
Accommodation, supra note 18. 
20. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012); see,
e.g., Barnett, 535 U.S. at 396 (“[T]he ADA says that ‘discrimination’ includes an employer’s 
‘not making reasonable accommodations . . . .’”). 
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C) (2012); see, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 630
(1998).
22. See infra Section II.C.
 23. See generally JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 (50th anniversary ed. 1989); see also 
Catch-22, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/catch-22 [https://
perma.cc/WRP8-N8SR] (defining catch-22 as “a problematic situation for which the only 
solution is denied by a circumstance inherent in the problem or by a rule”). 
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2012); see also About EEOC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ [https://perma.cc/H2VX-NRUF]; Disability
Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/
types/disability.cfm [https://perma.cc/4XMW-63DB] (listing ADA as an EEOC-enforced 
law). 
25. The EEOC routinely administers administrative guidelines to aid in federal
employment law enforcement, such as the ADA; however, the courts do not consistently 
defer to the agency’s guidelines.  See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 
482 (1999) (declining to defer to EEOC’s interpretation of ADA as adopted by agency’s 
guidelines), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Acts of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 
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courts have played an instrumental role in interpreting the interactive
process’s trigger, circuits inconsistently apply the ADA.26  An effective
solution, therefore, will require Congress to amend the ADA once again 
and reconcile this circuit split.27 
This Comment proposes solutions to help ensure persons with mental 
disabilities are supported in the workplace and will proceed in the following 
manner. Part II examines the historical background of the ADA and the 
employer’s role and duties under the ADA.28  This Part also briefly describes
the elements of a “failure to accommodate” claim and a “regarded as” claim.29 
Part III explores the current trend of ADA mental disability claims and
explains how the current ADA limits employers to “reactive”—rather than 
proactive—solutions.30  This reactive approach only confuses employers
and inhibits the assimilation of persons with mental disabilities into the 
workplace.31  Finally, Part IV recommends how Congress can amend the
ADA to require employees to disclose their disabilities to their employers 
before an employer can be held liable for failing to accommodate an individual’s 
disability.32  Requiring an employee to disclose a mental disability to an 
employer gives the employer a clear signal to engage in an interactive process 
with the employee to find an effective accommodation.33  Additionally, 
Congress should prohibit plaintiffs from pleading in the alternative with 
respect to failure to accommodate and regarded as discrimination claims.34 
These relatively small changes to the ADA will make it easier for employers
and employees to work together, which will help to integrate qualified persons 
with mental disabilities into the workplace.
II. A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO THE ADA 
In 1990, Congress passed the ADA, finding that “some 43,000,000 
Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this number
122 Stat. 3554; see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984) (explaining Chevron deference as “[t]he power of an administrative agency to 
administer a congressionally created . . . program, [which] necessarily requires the formulation
of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress”
(quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974))).
26. See infra notes 76–89 and accompanying text. 
27. See infra Part IV.
 28. See infra Sections II.A., II.B.
29.  See infra Section II.C.
 30. See infra Part III. 
31. See infra Sections III.B, III.C.
 32. See infra Part IV. 
33. See infra Section IV.B.1.
 34. See infra Section IV.B.2.
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is increasing as the population as a whole is growing older.”35  Initially, 
courts narrowly construed the ADA’s scope of protection and held that 
several mental illnesses, such as bipolar disorder, were not covered by the 
ADA.36  As a result, Congress amended the ADA in 2008, expressly 
admonishing courts for interpreting the Act narrowly.37 
Congress intended the 1990 ADA enactment and 2008 ADA amendments 
to promote equal opportunity for individuals with disabilities.38  This Part 
examines the historical progression of the ADA,39 the employer’s role 
under the ADA,40 and the elements establishing failure to accommodate 
and regarded as discrimination claims.41 
A. A Brief History of the ADA 
Under the first version of the ADA, enacted in 1990, persons with
mental disabilities were commonly denied protected status under the ADA.42 
After nearly two decades of backlash, Congress introduced amendments 
35. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2008) (amended 
2009).
36. See, e.g., Holt v. Grand Lake Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 443 F.3d 762, 766–67
(10th Cir. 2006) (holding cerebral palsy outside scope of ADA); Blanks v. Sw. Bell 
Commc’ns, Inc., 310 F.3d 398, 399 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding HIV infection outside scope 
of ADA); Sorensen v. Univ. of Utah Hosp., 194 F.3d 1084, 1085 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding 
multiple sclerosis outside scope of ADA); Horwitz v. L & J.G. Stickley, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 
2d 350, 357–58 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding bipolar disorder outside scope of ADA); Hirsch 
v. Nat’l Mall & Serv., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 977, 980–82 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding cancer outside
scope of ADA).  See generally Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall 
for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 108 (1999) (finding 94% of employers won 
ADA claims at trial court level). 
37. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(1), (4), 122 Stat.
3553, 3553 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012)) (“[I]n enacting the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Congress intended that the Act ‘provide a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities’ and provide broad coverage. . . . [T]he holdings of the Supreme Court . . . 
have narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA, thus 
eliminating protection for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect . . . .”).  The 
amended ADA thus reinstated “a broad scope of protection to be available under the ADA.”  
Id. § 2(b)(1). 
38.  42 U.S.C. § 12101. 
 39. See infra Section II.A.
 40. See infra Section II.B.
 41. See infra Section II.C.
42. See Allison Duncan, Defining Disability in the ADA: Sutton v. United Airlines, 
Inc., 60 LA. L. REV. 967, 968 (2000); see also infra Section II.A.1. 
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that grossly broadened the ADA’s scope.43  Without a clear trigger to the
interactive process, however, this expanded category of ADA-protected 
individuals is unable to fully realize their statutorily protected rights to 
reasonable accommodations.44  This is why employers should be given an
opportunity to engage in the interactive process with a straightforward 
trigger for the interactive process.45 
1. ADA Enactment in 1990
When first enacted in 1990,46 the ADA prohibited employers from 
discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability47 and was 
“the first statute to prohibit discrimination based on disability in the private 
sector.”48  The ADA supplied persons with disabilities with a cause of
action for traditional forms of discrimination, as well as for an employer’s 
failure to make reasonable accommodations.49 Congress required employers 
to make reasonable accommodations so that persons with disabilities could 
“be part of the economic mainstream of our society.”50 
43. See infra Section II.A.2.
 44. See infra Section III.C.
 45. See infra Section IV.B.1.
46. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012).  Prior to the ADA’s
enactment, disabled individuals were protected under the Rehabilitation Act.  Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 794 (2012)).  Additionally, many states had already enacted similar laws.  See Alex Long, 
State Anti-Discrimination Law as a Model for Amending the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 597, 628 (2004) [hereinafter Long, State Anti-Discrimination Law 
as a Model] (“By 1990, the number of states that explicitly included a reasonable accommodation 
requirement in their statutes had grown to twenty-seven.”).  However, “even though many 
states prohibited discrimination against individuals with disabilities prior to the enactment 
of the ADA in 1990, state laws were far from uniform and frequently provided less protection 
than that ultimately provided by the ADA.”  Alex B. Long, “If the Train Should Jump the 
Track . . .”: Divergent Interpretations of State and Federal Employment Discrimination 
Statutes, 40 GA. L. REV. 469, 477–78 (2006) [hereinafter Long, Divergent Interpretations]
(footnotes omitted). 
47.  42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012). 
48. Nicole Buonocore Porter, Special Treatment Stigma After the ADA Amendments
Act, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 213, 219 (2016) (citing RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: 
THE FIRST DECADE OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 19 (2005)). The reason the 
legislation focused on the term “disability” was because “handicap” had a negative connotation in 
American culture.  See Malinda Orlin, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Implications 
for Social Services, 40 SOC. WORK 233, 234 (1995). 
49.  42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012). 
50. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 10 (1988).  The Senate Report notes: “Individuals with
disabilities experience staggering levels of unemployment and poverty,” and “a large majority 
of those not working say that they want to work.”  Id. at 9.  Yet still, once they entered the 
workplace, one of the “major categories of job discrimination faced by people with disabilities 
include[s] . . . failure to provide or make available reasonable accommodations.”  Id. 
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Yet, courts were leery of a statute that imposed such broad and affirmative
obligations on employers.  Consequently, courts narrowly construed the 
definition of “disability.”51 Courts worried that it would be too difficult
for them to determine what a reasonable accommodation is for each unique 
type of job, employer, and industry.52 
A number of reasons helped pave the way for this judicial backlash.
Congress had not faced much opposition when it enacted the legislation
in 1990.53  Most states had already enacted state antidiscrimination laws 
regarding disability,54 several Congressmen had personal connections to 
disabled individuals,55 and Congress enacted the ADA at a time when the
legislative branch “was largely receptive to the demands of civil rights 
groups.”56 Because Congress faced little opposition to the ADA, Congress
did not have to engage the public about the scope of its protections and 
the kinds of costs and tradeoffs that it—like all legislation—would entail.57 
51. See Porter, supra note 48, at 220 (“In other words, if the plaintiff never proceeds 
past the coverage question, the court never has to answer the more difficult question of whether 
the plaintiff should succeed on the merits, which often involves an issue of whether the 
employer is obligated to provide a reasonable accommodation to the employee.” (citing 
Nicole Buonocore Porter, Martinizing Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 47 
GA. L. REV. 527, 542 (2013))). 
52. See id. at 219–20 (“[C]ourts’ reluctance to make employers broadly restructure 
a job or the physical workspace and the difficulty in determining what accommodations 
are reasonable has [likely] contributed to courts narrowly construing the definition of disability.” 
(citing Porter, supra note 51, at 542)). 
53. See Michael Selmi, Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act: Why the 
Supreme Court Rewrote the Statute, and Why Congress Did Not Care, 76 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 522, 522 n.3 (2008). 
54. See Long, State Anti-Discrimination Law as a Model, supra note 46, at 627 
(“[B]y the time of the ADA’s enactment in 1990, forty-eight states and the District of 
Columbia had statutes prohibiting disability-based discrimination in the private sector.”). 
55. See Selmi, supra note 53, at 538–39. 
56. Id. at 539.  For a comparison between the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the ADA,
see generally Robert D. Dinerstein, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Progeny of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, HUM. RTS., Summer 2004, at 10. 
57. See Selmi, supra note 53, at 541–42.  The ADA passed into legislation relatively 
easily:
Of all the civil rights statutes that were passed towards the end of the decade, 
the ADA was perhaps the least controversial.  The Family and Medical Leave 
Act was vetoed twice by President Bush; the Civil Rights Act of 1990 was 
likewise vetoed, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was headed for a veto until the 
Clarence Thomas hearings intervened.  As a consequence, all of these statutes received 
more congressional attention, and more legislative massaging, than the ADA. 
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Consequently, Congress did not have to persuade the American public or 
various interest groups about the need to protect persons with diverse 
disabilities from discrimination or to extend to them the novel right of 
reasonable accommodation.58 
This judicial backlash59 effectively limited the number of mental disabilities 
protected under the ADA.60 A number of appellate courts denied plaintiffs’
claims based on mental disabilities, concluding that mental disabilities, such 
as post-traumatic stress disorder and depression, were not substantially 
limiting enough to be protected under the ADA.61  In 2002, the Supreme 
Court again limited the scope of plaintiffs with ADA-protected disabilities 
when the Court interpreted the ADA’s “substantially limited” language as 
“severely restrict[ed]” in regards to the ability to perform major life 
functions.62 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  “[L]ack of controversy, however, can just as easily lead to problems
during the implementation phase of the statute—problems that might have been addressed 
through more careful congressional deliberation.”  Id. at 539. 
58. Id. at 543 (“Given the apparent limited support for an expansive definition, it is 
worth noting that the public advocacy that did occur in support of the statute all focused on 
traditional disabilities.”).  In other words, there was “no apparent public support for an expansive 
definition of disability.”  Id. at 542. 
59. The critical backbone of the judicial backlash began in 1999 with the Sutton
trilogy.  See Porter, supra note 48, at 220.  See generally Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 
527 U.S. 471, 475–76 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Acts of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3554; Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516, 518–
19 (1999); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 558 (1999). 
60. See, e.g., Horwitz v. L & J.G. Stickley, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 350, 350–51, 354, 
358 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (granting summary judgment for employer-defendant against plaintiff 
diagnosed with bipolar disorder because, although bipolar disorder “can constitute an 
impairment,” impairment does not necessarily constitute ADA-protected disability).  Perhaps 
this result was because, at the time, “much of the larger disagreement over the Americans 
with Disabilities Act [could] be characterized as a clash of perspectives about the meaning 
of disability.”  Richard K. Scotch, Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 213, 213 (2000).  “[U]nderlying assumptions about disability 
frame[d] the . . . debate over the ADA.”  Id. 
 61. See, e.g., Rohan v. Networks Presentations L.L.C., 375 F.3d 266, 276 (4th Cir. 
2004). The Rohan court observed the plaintiff experienced about thirty sporadic episodes, 
which rendered the plaintiff “almost completely incapable of interacting with others during 
her episodes.”  Id.  However, the court stated that, “[i]ntermittent manifestations of an illness 
are insufficient to establish a substantial limitation on a major life activity.”  Id.; see also 
Ogborn v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local No. 881, 305 F.3d 763, 767–
78 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding employee not disabled under ADA for suffering from depression 
because plaintiff had not shown how depression substantially limited work performance); 
Swanson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 268 F.3d 307, 316 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding depressed surgical 
resident “impaired . . . by his depression but not substantially limited”). 
62. Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002), superseded by statute, 
ADA Amendments Acts of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3554; see also Hensel, supra 
note 7, at 80. 
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In sum, under the 1990 ADA, plaintiffs met the definition of an “individual
with a disability” only if they had a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limited a major life activity, had a record of such impairment, or
was regarded as having such an impairment.63  This narrow reading of
disability undermined the ADA’s purpose because courts easily determined 
that plaintiffs did not meet the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination, 
and thus courts commonly dismissed ADA claims at summary judgment.64 
As a result, “[o]nly those with the most severe disorders, who correspondingly 
were the least likely to be employed, were able to establish” that they had 
disabilities.65 Plaintiffs with social difficulties common to many mental 
disabilities, such as the reduced ability to interact with others, were typically 
considered not disabled.66  Courts dismissed plaintiffs with mental disabilities 
that were not substantially limiting enough to be qualified under the ADA.67 
For example, at summary judgment, courts habitually dismissed plaintiffs 
who had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, severe anxiety, and 
depression.68 Statistically, only 7% of ADA plaintiffs survived summary 
63. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 3(2), 104 Stat. 
327, 330 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1990) (amended 2002)). 
64. See, e.g., Porter, supra note 48, at 219 (“[P]rior to the ADAAA, the courts 
narrowly interpreted the definition of disability, which resulted in a very restricted class 
of those who were entitled to protection of the ADA.”). For examples of courts dismissing 
ADA claims at summary judgment, see infra note 68. 
65. Hensel, supra note 7, at 80.
 66. See id. at 81–82; see also Comber v. Prologue, Inc., No. CIV.JFM–99–2637,
2000 WL 1481300, at *2, *6 (D. Md. Sept. 28, 2000) (holding plaintiff with autism not 
disabled). 
67. Hensel, supra note 7, at 82. “Ironically, many of the same courts that rejected
interacting with others as a major life activity concluded that ‘getting along with others’ 
was an essential function of nearly every job.”  Id.  “Courts also found the ability to handle 
stressful situations without upsetting others to be a critical and universal job function.”  
Id.; see Calef v. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75, 86 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding employee diagnosed 
with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), prone to outbursts during stressful 
situations, unqualified under ADA)). 
68. See, e.g., Horwitz v. L & J.G. Stickley, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 350, 353–54, 358
(N.D.N.Y. 2000); see also McCarron v. British Telecom, No. 00-CV-6123, 2002 WL 
1832843, at *9–10 (E.D. Penn. Aug. 7, 2002) (declining to consider bipolar disorder as 
disability under ADA and instead relying on whether morbid obesity was disability); Doebele 
v. Sprint Corp., 157 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1200, 1212 (D. Kan. 2001) (holding plaintiff diagnosed 
with bipolar disorder and ADHD deemed not disabled under ADA), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 342 F.3d 1117 (10th Cir. 2003); Lottinger v. Shell Oil Co., 143 F. Supp. 2d 743, 747, 
780 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (holding plaintiff diagnosed with depression deemed not disabled 
under ADA); Scherer v. GE Capital Corp., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1134, 1136 (D. Kan. 1999) 
(holding plaintiff diagnosed with severe anxiety deemed not disabled under ADA). 
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judgment.69  Thus, the 1990 ADA was widely considered to be a failure in 
protecting individuals with disabilities in the workplace.70 
2. 2008 Amendments 
Dissatisfied with the courts’ narrow interpretation of disability,71 Congress 
passed the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) in 2008.72  The ADAAA 
expanded the scope of disability, including the scope of “mental” disability.73 
Congress emphasized that a court’s “determination of disability ‘should 
not demand extensive analysis,’ and ‘shall be construed in favor of broad
coverage . . . to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of [the] Act.’”74 
This change made it much easier for plaintiffs to survive summary judgment.75 
The ADAAA overturned several Supreme Court precedents: First, the
amendments explicitly direct courts to consider whether an impairment
substantially limits a major life activity “without regard to the ameliorative
effects of mitigating measures.”76  This overturned the Court’s ruling in
Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., which had held that whether a person had 
a disability had to be assessed with regard to any ameliorative measures 
that an individual used.77 
Second, the amendments expanded the definition of disability in three 
ways. This expansion effectively overturned the Court’s ruling in Toyota 
Motor Manufacturing v. Williams, which had limited disabilities to only
impairments that were so severe that they prevented individuals from doing
activities that were “of central importance to most people’s daily lives.”78 
69. Hensel, supra note 7, at 81 (citing Colker, supra note 36, at 99–100). 
70.  For a list of scholarly explanations describing the originally enacted ADA’s failure 
to protect persons with disabilities and the subsequent judicial backlash, see Olsen, supra 
note 7, at 1493–96. 
71. See Porter, supra note 48, at 222. 
72.  Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012).
 73. Porter, supra note 48, at 223. 
74. Hensel, supra note 7, at 83 (footnotes omitted) (quoting ADA Amendments Act 
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, §§ 2(b)(5), 4(a)(4)(A), 122 Stat. 3553, 3553–55 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012)); see also Olsen, supra note 7, at 1491 (“Some legal 
scholars have described these amendments as ‘instructional,’ in the sense that the ADAAA 
directs courts to ‘interpret the same statutory language in a different way.’” (quoting Kate 
Webber, Correcting the Supreme Court—Will It Listen? Using the Models of Judicial Decision- 
Making To Predict the Future of the ADA Amendments Act, 21 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 305, 
325 (2014))).
75. See Porter, supra note 48, at 217; Porter, supra note 51, at 536–37; Nicole
Buonocore Porter, The New ADA Backlash, 82 TENN. L. REV. 1, 19–46 (2014). 
76.  42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i); see also Porter, supra note 48, at 223–24.
77. 527 U.S. 471, 475, 482 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Acts 
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3554. 
78. Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002), superseded by statute,
ADA Amendments Acts of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3554. 
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Congress abandoned the Court’s narrow reading of disabilities covered 
under the ADA, opting instead for a broad interpretation of disability that 
affected a nonexhaustive list of “major life activities.”79  Major life activities
include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, learning, concentrating, 
thinking, communicating, and working.80 
Additionally, an impairment may still be considered a disability when 
it is in remission.81  As a result, “episodic” impairments are protected under 
the ADA.82  Temporary impairments also qualify for protection under the
ADA, so long as the impairment substantially limits a major life activity.83 
For example, in Summers v. Altarum Institute, Corp., the Fourth Circuit
noted that the ADAAA did not impose a durational requirement for “actual” 
disabilities.84 
79.  42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(b), 12102(2); see also Porter, supra note 48, at 223. 
80. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).  Prior to the 2008 amendment, “some courts had
previously refused to recognize” the activities on this list as major life activities.  Hensel, 
supra note 7, at 83; see, e.g., Humbles v. Principi, 141 F. App’x 709, 712 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(“[I]nteractions with others and concentration have not been deemed major life activities 
by this circuit.”); Boerst v. Gen. Mills Operations, Inc., 25 F. App’x 403, 406 (6th Cir. 
2002) (holding “concentrating” not major life activity); Curtis D. Edmonds, Snakes and 
Ladders: Expanding the Definition of “Major Life Activity” in the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 33 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 321, 325 (2002). 
81. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D) (“An impairment that is episodic or in remission is a
disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.”). 
82. See, e.g., Howard v. Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, No. 11-1938, 2013 WL 102662, 
at *11 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2013) (holding fibromyalgia, though episodic and only appearing 
in wet or rainy weather, protected under ADA).  Fibromyalgia is believed to be both a mental 
and physical impairment.  See Fibromyalgia: Symptoms & Causes, MAYO CLINIC, https:// 
www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/fibromyalgia/symptoms-causes/syc-20354780 
[https://perma.cc/4R96-37QS] (“Researchers believe that fibromyalgia amplifies painful
sensations by affecting the way your brain processes pain signals.”). 
83. See, e.g., Summers v. Altarum Inst., Corp., 740 F.3d 325, 333 (4th Cir. 2014). 
84. Id. at 332.  The ADAAA only “imposes a six-month requirement with respect
to ‘regarded-as’ disabilities.”  Id. 
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Finally, the ADAAA broadened the regarded as prong.85  Subsequently,
courts have heeded Congress’s mandate to broaden the definition of disability; 
as a result, far more plaintiffs are surviving summary judgment.86 
While Congress has expanded who the ADA protects, it has not significantly 
expanded protections for individuals with disabilities, particularly individuals 
with mental disabilities. This larger group of protected persons cannot 
maximize ADA benefits because employers are afraid to initiate an interactive 
process to provide an employee with reasonable accommodations because
doing so can expose them to liability for regarding that individual as 
disabled.87 
B. The Employer’s Role Under the ADA 
The employer’s role is focused on preventative law and guided by 
statutory restrictions, whereas the employee’s course of legal action is
centered around reactive law,88 with two potential causes of action that 
directly contradict one another.89  This Section examines the employer’s 
statutorily constrained role and explains why employees are currently unable 
to enjoy the ADA’s broad protections until after the employee files a 
lawsuit. 
To begin, employers cannot inquire about an employee’s disability.90 
Nor can they require any medical examinations before extending an
employment offer.91  Additionally, they cannot request employee medical
85. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (“An individual meets the requirement of ‘being
regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual establishes that he or she has 
been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived 
physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit 
a major life activity.”).  Under the ADAAA, “an ADA plaintiff no longer faces the difficult 
task of proving that a defendant’s misperception of his or her condition was so severe as 
to amount to a belief that the condition substantially limited a major life activity.  Instead, 
the new amendments place the focus on the employer’s motivation.”  Alex B. Long, Introducing 
the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act: Assessing the ADA Amendments 
Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 224 (2008). 
86. See Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes Under the
ADA Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027, 2031–32 (2013).  For a discussion 
of how the broader reading of disability applied to Title II of the ADA, as well, see Ryan 
Ballard & Chris Henry, Mediation and Mental Health Claims Under the ADA, 44 CAP. U. 
L. REV. 31, 52–54 (2016). 
87. See infra Part III. 
88.  For a comparison of proactive and reactive law, see infra Section III.C.3.
 89. See infra Section II.C.
 90. See Hensel, supra note 7, at 86 (“Individuals with disabilities may not be forced
to disclose their [disability] status in any respect.”). 
91. Id. at 86 (“These broad prohibitions extend to every step of the hiring process, 
including written job applications, employment interviews, and—increasingly significant 
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records to show a substantially limiting disability,92 nor may employers
rely solely upon a physician’s opinion as to whether an employee has a mental 
disability and is in need of reasonable accommodations.93  Furthermore, 
an employee’s failure to make direct requests for specific accommodations 
does not relieve an employer of the duty to provide reasonable 
accommodations.94  These prohibitions against disclosure act as barriers 
to ADA-protected employees because employers are less likely to initiate 
the interactive process when they can be held liable for regarded as 
discrimination.95 
In order for ADA-protected employees to enjoy the full benefits of the
ADA and receive reasonable accommodations, an employer should have 
notice of the employee’s disability so that it can enter into the interactive 
process without worrying about regarded as liability.96  As described below,
coaxing employee disclosure through new legislation will give employers 
an opportunity to engage in the interactive process without worrying about 
regarded as liability.97 
in the digital age—any background investigation conducted by the employer directly or
indirectly.”).
92. Both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have held that the ADA’s statutory language, 
the EEOC’s implementing regulations, and case law do not require employees to supply 
the employer with any medical testimony to prove an employee’s substantial limitations.  
Frank C. Morris, Jr., Selected Developments Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, SY002 
ALI-CLE 751 (2016) (citing EEOC v. AutoZone Inc., 630 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2010); Head 
v. Glacier Nw. Inc., 413 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
93. See, e.g., Lafata v. Dearborn Heights Sch. Dist. No. 7, No. 13-cv-10755, 2013
WL 6500068, at *9–10 (S.D. Mich. Dec. 11, 2013) (“[Doctor’s] deposition testimony 
reflects that his examination of Plaintiff was neither lengthy nor comprehensive.  The School 
District has a duty to review [the doctor’s] report to assure itself that his examination and 
analysis were thorough and/or reasonable.”). 
94. See, e.g., Heath v. Brennan, No. 2:13-cv-00386-JDL, 2015 WL 2340781, at *7– 
8, *10 (D. Me. May 14, 2015) (holding employee’s history of disabilities and prior EEOC 
complaints and settlement agreements still gave employer reason to know it should engage 
in interactive process to ascertain reasonable accommodations for employee—even though 
prior settlement agreements had not been breached). 
95. See infra Section II.C.2. 
96. See infra Section II.C.2. 
97. See infra Section IV.B.
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C. The Plaintiff’s Two Current Causes of Action that  
Create the Catch-22 
The employer’s dilemma here is couched between two causes of action: 
(1) failure to accommodate98 and (2) regarded as discrimination.99 
1. Failure to Accommodate 
Under the ADA, plaintiffs may file a suit for a failure to accommodate 
using two distinct methods.100  First, plaintiffs may show that (1) they are
a qualified individual with a disability that substantially limits a major life 
activity; (2) the employer knew or had reason to know the employee needed 
a reasonable accommodation; and (3) the employer failed to offer a reasonable 
accommodation to the employee.101  Once the employee establishes these 
elements, the burden shifts to the employer to show that an accommodation 
would place an “undue hardship” on the employer.102 
Second, and more pertinently here, plaintiffs may show that (1) the employer 
knew or had reason to know that the qualified individual had a disability, 
(2) the employer knew or had reason to know that the employee needed a
reasonable accommodation, and (3) the employer failed to initiate the interactive 
process.103  In other words, liability for failing to provide a reasonable
accommodation does not require discriminatory animus; it only requires 
proof that the employer did not sufficiently engage in the interactive process 
98.  Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2012). 
99. Id. § 12102(1)(C). 
100. Id. § 12112(b)(5); see also U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 407 (2002) 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (“The Court of Appeals also correctly held that there was a triable issue 
of fact precluding the entry of summary judgment with respect to whether petitioner violated 
the statute by failing to engage in an interactive process concerning respondent’s three proposed 
accommodations.”). 
101. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5).  Reasonable accommodations may include “job
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, 
acquisition or modification of equipment or devices . . . and other similar accommodations 
for individuals with disabilities.”  Id. § 12111(9)(B). 
102. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).  This Comment does not examine undue hardship in detail 
because this burden shift happens at trial, and this Comment is focused on keeping employers 
compliant without a trial.  For another look at burden shifting in the employment law context, 
see generally Joss Teal, Comment, A Survivor’s Tale: McDonnell Douglas in a Post-Nassar 
World, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 937 (2018). 
103. See, e.g., Barnett, 535 U.S. at 407 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Gray v.
U.S. Steel Corp., No. 2:09-cv-327-APR, 2013 WL 6682951, at *20 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 17, 2013)
(“In failure to accommodate cases, in addition to showing that he is a qualified disabled 
individual, the plaintiff must show that the employer was aware of his disability and failed 
to accommodate it.”). 
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to provide the employee with a reasonable accommodation.104  Thus, having
reason to know under the second prong  triggers an employer’s duty to initiate 
an interactive process.  This reason to know standard directly conflicts with 
the second cause of action described below. 
2. Regarded As Discrimination
Plaintiffs may also file regarded as claims under the ADAAA.105  There
are two ways that a plaintiff may show regarded as discrimination here: 
(1) an employer mistakenly believes that an employee has a mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) an employer 
mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits 
one or more major life activities.106  In either case, the employer must have 
“entertain[ed] misperceptions about the individual.”107 
This second option creates tension with the reason to know standard discussed
above because employers face liability for failing to trigger the interactive 
process without explicitly knowing of an employee’s disability.  Yet, an
employer may also face liability for assuming that an employee is disabled.
Additionally, just to cover their bases, plaintiffs are increasingly filing
104. See THOMSON REUTERS, EXECUTIVE LEGAL SUMMARY NO. 349, REASONABLE 
ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE ADA (2019) (“An employer can breach 
this duty to accommodate without being motivated by any discriminatory animus.”). 
105. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2012).
Congress added the regarded as prong to hamper discrimination based on “archaic attitudes” 
and “erroneous but nevertheless prevalent perceptions about the handicapped.”  Sch. Bd. 
of Nassau Cty v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987). 
106. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A), (C) (2012); see also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Acts of 2008, Pub. 
L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3554. 
107. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489.  That is, the worker need only show that the employer believed
that the worker had a mental or physical impairment, not that such impairment affected 
him or her to any specific degree; under the “regarded as” prong, the employer’s perception 
about the worker is the court’s pivotal inquiry.  Sowell v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 139 F. Supp. 
3d 684, 700 (E.D. Pa. 2015); Douglas A. Haas, Could the American Psychiatric Association 
Cause You Headaches? The Dangerous Interaction Between the DSM-5 and Employment 
Law, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 683, 699 (2013) (“While an employer is not required to provide 
reasonable accommodations to individuals who are only ‘regarded as’ disabled under the 
ADA, the post-ADAAA regulations add that ‘regarded as’ disability discrimination may 
arise from adverse employment actions taken based on the symptoms of actual or perceived 
impairments, or on medication used to treat such impairments.” (footnotes omitted) (citing 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1) (2019))).  Both of these causes of action under the ADA are part 
of what is known as “reactive” law because they can only guarantee rights through litigation, 
i.e. after an employer has already infringed upon a right.  See infra Section III.C.3. 
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both causes of action against the employer.108  Congress can alleviate this 
tension by making some minor adjustments to the ADA.109  
III. THE CURRENT ADA’S AMBIGUOUS TRIGGER ENSNARES 
EMPLOYERS IN INEVITABLE LEGAL LIABILITY 
The problem sketched above110 is dire.  The current ADA provisions lead
to absurd results—this cannot be what Congress intended when enacting the 
ADA.111  If an employer cannot inquire about an employee’s limitations, 
require a medical exam, or ask for medical records, an employer is left 
with nothing but its impressions that an employee may have a disability.  
But relying on such “impressions” resembles nothing more than relying 
on stereotypes about disabilities—that is, resembles nothing more than 
“regarding” a worker as disabled.
This framework is disadvantageous to both the employer and the employee: 
employers face liability, and employees are not offered a reasonable 
accommodation.112  Thus, Congress should require employee disclosure
of a disability as an element in failure to accommodate claims to encourage 
disclosure and get employees what they actually need—reasonable 
accommodations—not legal fees.113 
Additionally, Congress should bar some forms of alternative pleading 
in ADA suits.  Congress implemented the regarded as prong of the ADAAA 
to debunk the “myths, fears[,] and stereotypes associated with disabilities,”114 
108.  Employees continue to file both failures to accommodate and regarded as claims
in the same suit.  See, e.g., Southall v. USF Holland, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-1266, 2018 WL 6413651, 
*7–8 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 5, 2018) (alleging both that (1) plaintiff qualified as disabled under 
ADA for failure to accommodate, and (2) defendant-employer discriminated against 
plaintiff-employee by regarding plaintiff as disabled). 
109. See infra Part IV. 
110. See supra Section II.C.
111. Congress did not intend to terrify employers with legal liability to the point that
they fear offering employees reasonable accommodations; instead, Congress sought to integrate 
persons with disabilities into the workplace with employers’ help—with reasonable 
accommodations.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2012).  Although thus far Congress has 
relied on the courts to interpret ambiguities, the judicial interpretation approach has led to 
circuit splits.  See infra notes 76–89 and accompanying text.  The increasing numbers of 
ADA plaintiffs demonstrate that Congress should settle these circuit splits and clarify the 
interactive process’s trigger so that qualified individuals get reasonable accommodations—not 
court fees.  See infra Sections III.A, III.B. 
112.  For a discussion of unachieved ADA policy goals, see infra Section III.B.
 113. See infra Section IV.B.1.
114. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 490 (1999), (quoting 29 C.F.R. 
app. § 1630.2(l) (2019)), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Acts of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3554. 
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and to broaden the coverage of the ADA.115 However, allowing for alternative
pleading when employees are pursuing a failure to accommodate claim does 
not help discredit such notions; alternative pleading only gives plaintiffs 
another option for recovery.116  By statutorily restricting this alternative pleading
approach, Congress can help make sure that employees are getting the help 
they need without filing a lawsuit.117 
This Part explores three key reasons why Congress should amend the
ADA. First, current trends show that employers are increasingly more likely 
to face liability under the ADA.118  With the upsurge in mental disability 
diagnoses, employers are increasingly more likely to encounter a candidate 
with a mental disability or an employee whose disability is not easily apparent 
and who may not request a reasonable accommodation.119  Unfortunately,
circuits do not uniformly interpret employer liability under the ADA,120 
which means employers still remain without much guidance—even with 
judicial interpretations of the ADA.
Second, today’s predicament establishes that the ADA’s policy goals 
remain unachieved.121  If employers are unable to take the necessary steps
to help employees with mental disabilities, then disabled employees are not 
able to enjoy the same employment opportunities as their nondisabled 
coworkers.122  This lack of workplace opportunity means that the ADA is
still not adequately protecting disabled employees.123 
Finally, this Part explores proactive methods of guaranteeing these statutory 
rights to ADA-protected individuals.124  Other solutions proposed, such as 
115. See Haas, supra note 107, at 697–98 (“Finally, the ADAAA rejected federal courts’ 
requirement that plaintiffs alleging ‘regarded as’ disability prove that defendants perceived 
their real or imagined disabilities to be ‘substantially limiting.’  Instead, to satisfy this 
prong, the Act only required plaintiffs to prove that they suffered disability discrimination 
‘because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the 
impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.’  The ADAAA also 
provided that employers need not extend a reasonable accommodation to individuals who 
merely satisfy the ‘regarded as’ definition of disability.” (footnotes omitted)).   
116.  For a discussion of reactive and proactive law, see infra Section III.C.3.
 117. See infra Section III.C.3.
 118. See infra Sections III.A.1, III.A.3. 
119. See infra Sections III.A.1, III.A.3. 
120. See infra Section III.A.2.
 121. See infra Section III.B.
 122. See infra Section III.B.
 123. See infra Section III.B.
 124. See infra Section III.C.
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factors tests and mediation, are simply reactive solutions to this problem.125 
Additionally, although the EEOC plays an instrumental role in enforcing 
the ADA, this role is also a reactive response.126  Employers need a proactive
approach and better congressional guidance to help ensure that their disabled 
employees have the best support possible.127 
For these reasons, Congress should delineate a clearer approach to the 
interactive process by requiring employee disclosure as an element in failure 
to accommodate claims.128  This disclosure would thus explicitly trigger the 
interactive process.129  Additionally, Congress should prohibit dual pleading of 
regarded as and failure to accommodate claims.130 
A. Contemporary Trends Show that Employers Increasingly 
Face Legal Liability Under the ADA 
Some scholars argue that the 2008 amendment eliminated any catch-22 
in the ADA.131  However, the catch-22 has merely shifted, instead entrapping 
employers rather than plaintiffs.132 As a result of the 2008 amendments to
the ADA, far more plaintiffs’ ADA cases are surviving summary judgment.133 
Although recent legal amendments have encouraged employers to hire
disabled employees,134 these amendments “unquestionably” make the 
reasonable accommodation request process more challenging because 
employees with mental disabilities often have “unique needs.”135  Without
encouraging employee disclosure by requiring it as an element of a failure 
to accommodate claim,136 employers will continue to miss opportunities
125. See infra Section III.C.1. 
126. See infra Section III.C.2. 
127. See infra Section III.C.3. 
128. See infra Section IV.B.1.
 129. See infra Section IV.B.1.
 130. See infra Section IV.B.2.
 131. See, e.g., Ballard & Henry, supra note 86, at 51. 
132.  See supra Section II.C. 
133.  See Befort, supra note 86, at 2050 (finding significantly lower rates of courts 
granting summary judgment to employers for disability finding after passage of ADA 
Amendments Act).
134. See Hensel, supra note 7, at 75–76.  The 2016 amendment to the Rehabilitation 
Act “require[s] some federal contractors to attempt to achieve a workforce comprised of 
at least 7% of employees with disabilities.” Id.; see also Olsen, supra note 7, at 1488 n.11
(citing Affirmative Action and Nondiscrimination Obligations of Contractors and Subcontractors 
Regarding Individuals with Disabilities, 78 Fed. Reg. 58,681, 58,682 (Sept. 24, 2013) 
(codified as amended at 41 C.F.R. pt. 60-741 (2019)). These recent legal amendments have
helped created equal opportunities for both mentally disabled employees—to gain employment 
in the workplace—and employers—“to tap into the talents and abilities of a sizable
population of workers.”  Hensel, supra note 7, at 76. 
135. Hensel, supra note 7, at 76.
 136. See infra Section IV.B.1.
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to reasonably accommodate their ADA-protected employees and best
leverage their diverse workforces.137 
This Section examines how employers are increasingly more likely to 
hire persons with mental disabilities,138 how courts inconsistently interpret
the ADA’s trigger to the interactive process,139 and how the number of ADA
plaintiffs is only growing.140  Thus, as the ADA currently stands, employers
will undoubtedly find themselves in a dilemma—unable to offer reasonable 
accommodations to their mentally disabled employees for fear of regarded 
as liability. 
1. As Mental Disability Diagnoses Continue to Increase, the 
Number of Employees with Mental Disabilities 
Will Also Increase in the Workplace 
The number of mental diagnoses has increased dramatically since the 
first enactment of the ADA in 1990.141  A recent U.S. Census Bureau report 
estimates that one in five Americans has a disability.142  Since the 1980s,
mental health diagnoses have more than doubled, and for children, mental 
health diagnoses have increased more than 3000%.143 With the medical
community’s growing recognition that mental health is equally as important 
as physical health, Americans will continue to see an increase in mental 
disability diagnoses.144 
137. See infra Section III.B.
 138. See infra Section III.A.1.
 139. See infra Section III.A.2.
 140. See infra Section III.A.3.
 141. See, e.g., Hensel, supra note 7, at 74. 
142.  Nearly 1 in 5 People Have a Disability in the U.S., Census Bureau Reports, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU (July 25, 2012), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/ 
miscellaneous/cb12-134.html [https://perma.cc/FPQ8-K3F4].
143. See Lauren Fierro, Note and Comment, Reasonably Accommodating Employees 
with Mental Health Conditions by Putting Them Back to Work, 46 SW. L. REV. 423, 429 
(2017).  Autism diagnoses, for example, have increased more than 78% since 2007.  Hensel, 
supra note 7, at 74.  Recent studies estimate that one out of every sixty-eight children suffers 
from autism.  Id.  Over the next decade, studies suggest “a 230 percent increase in the 
number of [young people] with autism transitioning to adulthood.”  Michelle Diament, As 
More with Autism Near Adulthood, Clues to Success Emerge, DISABILITY SCOOP (May 14, 
2015), https://www.disabilityscoop.com/2015/05/14/as-autism-adulthood-clues/20299/ [https:// 
perma.cc/58LU-26GT]. 
144. The medical community’s growing recognition is reflected in the 2015 changes 
to the Medical College Admission Test (MCAT).  See Barry Hong, The Teaching of Psychology 
and the New MCAT, AM.PSYCHOL.ASS’N (Aug. 2012), https://www.apa.org/ed/precollege/ptn/ 
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Although many physically disabled plaintiffs’ claims may be dismissed
because the individual is an unqualified individual in a blue-collar company,145 
workplace trends show a growing shift toward white-collar employment.146 
In other words, more persons with mental disabilities are entering offices,
which may be better equipped to make reasonable accommodations without 
undue hardship to the company.  However, what was once deemed 
inappropriate office behavior, and a terminable offense, may actually be
protected under the ADA.147  Unfortunately, this means that employers are
less likely to take proactive approaches to managing workplace performance 
or offer reasonable accommodations because an employer may be held 
liable for regarding an employee as mentally disabled.148 
2012/08/mcat.aspx [https://perma.cc/LJ9G-9W4X].  The MCAT had not been changed since 
1991. Id.  However, the MCAT now tests on psychology and behavior: 
The importance of the inclusion of psychology and behavioral science on the 
MCAT cannot be minimized.  Students who aspire to a career in medicine will 
be alerted to the fact that psychosocial/cultural issues matter and are as important 
as the biological and physical sciences because knowledge of the scientific 
aspects of psychology will need to be attained by pre[-]med students.  Thus, the 
new MCAT may strengthen the level of scientific psychology instruction in many 
colleges and universities.  Indirectly, the MCAT will help raise the awareness 
that psychological science is an embedded, essential aspect of health care. 
Id.  For a suggestion that adding the new portion on mental health to the MCAT was just 
“part of a decade-long effort by medical educators to restore a bit of good old-fashioned
healing and bedside patient skills into a profession that has come to be dominated by
technology and laboratory testing,” see Elisabeth Rosenthal, Pre-Med’s New Priorities: 
Heart and Soul and Social Science, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/04/15/education/edlife/pre-meds-new-priorities-heart-and-soul-and-social-science.html 
[https://perma.cc/48AW-Q5KH].
145. Employees may lose protection under the ADA because they must also be qualified 
to perform essential job functions.  In a blue-collar setting, attendance is often an essential 
job function, whereas white-collar settings invite alternative work schedules, such as work- 
from-home programs.  For an example of losing ADA coverage because regular attendance 
was an essential job function at a nursing center, see Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. 
Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1235 (9th Cir. 2012). 
146. Prior to the coronavirus pandemic, the United States had seen the lowest unemployment
rates in fifty years.  U.S. DEP’T LABOR, NEWS RELEASE: UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE WEEKLY 
CLAIMS (2018), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/OPA/newsreleases/ui-claims/20181534.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C4H7-5G7C] (lowest unemployment insurance claims filed since 1969);
see also Economic News Release: Job Openings and Labor Turnover Summary, U.S. DEP’T 
LAB., https://www.bls.gov/news.release/jolts.nr0.htm [https://perma.cc/QG4T-MG3J] (last
updated Feb. 11, 2020) (reporting more job openings than job seekers). However, “globalization 
and automation” have reduced blue-collar work.  Sean Gregory, The Jobs That Weren’t 
Saved, TIME (May 18, 2017), http://time.com/4783921/the-jobs-that-werent-saved/ [https://
perma.cc/52MK-QK3L]; see also Jacob Bogage, Coronavirus Unemployment Guide: What to
Do If You Get Laid Off or Furloughed, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.washington
post.com/business/2020/04/03/unemployed-coronavirus-faq/?arc404=true [https://perma.cc/
8V86-TUEK] (discussing how the coronavirus has decreased blue-collar jobs).
147. See supra Section III.B.
 148. See supra Section II.C.
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Compared to physical disabilities, mental disabilities offer a unique 
challenge because no two mental disabilities affect individuals in the same 
way, which “makes it difficult to offer categorical statements” regarding 
any mental disability.149 For example, some persons with mental disabilities
may actually have above average intelligence, which is advantageous for 
employers,150 but have “obsessive behaviors” and “delays in communication 
and language usage.”151  Thus, these varied symptoms and skillsets are
challenging for employers to navigate and determine whether the employer’s 
duty to engage in the interactive process has been triggered, especially for 
152 employers with limited resources.
The threat of regarded as discrimination thwarts reasonable accommodations
and thus undermines workplace productivity, spurs employee turnover,
and diminishes bottom lines. A recent study, for example, found that 31% 
of surveyed executives believed mental health issues “were the leading 
cause of lost productivity and increased absenteeism at work.”153  Other
research shows that employees diagnosed with major depressive disorders 
miss, on average,  about twenty-seven days of work annually, and employees 
diagnosed with bipolar disorder miss about sixty-five days.154  These absences
149. Hensel, supra note 7, at 76.
 150. See id. (“[T]here is little doubt that increasing numbers of individuals with 
[autism] will enter the labor pool over the next decade.  This shift presents tremendous 
opportunities both for people with autism to integrate into the workforce and for employers 
to tap into the talents and abilities of a sizable population of workers.”). For an example 
of successful companies leveraging diversity in the workplace, see Mary F. Salomon & 
Joan M. Schork, Turn Diversity to Your Advantage, 46 RES. TECH. MGMT., July–Aug. 
2003, at 37, 37. 
 151. Hensel, supra note 7, at 77 (citing Rebecca A. Johnson, “Pure” Science and “Impure” 
Influences: The DSM at a Scientific and Social Crossroads, 15 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE 
L. 147, 194 (2013)). 
152. See John J. Quinn, Personal Ethics and Business Ethics: The Ethical Attitudes
of Owner/Managers of Small Business, 16 J. BUS. ETHICS 119, 126 (1997). 
153. Ballard & Henry, supra note 86, at 31; see also WORLD HEALTH ORG., MENTAL 
HEALTH AND WORK: IMPACT, ISSUES, AND GOOD PRACTICES 1 (2000), https://www.who.int/mental
_health/media/en/712.pdf [https://perma.cc/TRT8-SCJE] (“The impact of mental health
problems in the workplace has serious consequences not only for the individual but also for the 
productivity of the enterprise.  Employee performance, rates of illness, absenteeism, accidents 
and staff turnover are all affected by employees’ mental health status.”). 
154. Ballard & Henry, supra note 86, at 31 (citing Ronald C. Kessler et al., Prevalence 
and Effects of Mood Disorders on Work Performance in a Nationally Representative 
Sample of U.S. Workers, 163 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1561, 1564 (2006)). 
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may cost employers up to $100 billion annually in lost productivity
alone.155 
Without improving the odds of engaging in the interactive process by 
requiring employee disclosure in failure to accommodate claims,156 employers
will be less able to discover reasonable accommodations for their employees 
with mental disabilities.157  Additionally, removing regarded as liability 
as an alternative cause of action158 will encourage employers to continue
engaging in the interactive process until the appropriate reasonable 
accommodations are discovered—and perhaps throughout the employee’s 
career. 
2. The Current Legal Landscape Demonstrates that Even Courts Are 
Unsure Whether Employers Have the Best Tools to 
Support Persons with Mental Disabilities 
Currently, employers do not have much legal guidance on the interactive
process.159  Congress has yet to clarify standards on the interactive process
with any statutes.  Examining case law, only one Supreme Court case has 
even mentioned the interactive process.160  This lack of legal guidance has
led circuits to inconsistently interpret what triggers the interactive process.161 
As a result, a number of courts have incorrectly applied ADA case law to
current disability claims.162  Thus, nonlegally trained employers are left to
construe an ambiguous law, and often face liability as a result.163 
The Supreme Court has only once commented on the interactive process.164 
In United States Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, the Supreme Court affirmed the
Ninth Circuit’s approach to determining whether an employer had violated
the ADA by analyzing whether the employer had failed to engage in the 
interactive process.165  Thus, although Barnett was heard in the early 2000s,
155. Fierro, supra note 143, at 429–30 (quoting Mental Health Conditions, NAT’L 
ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, https://www.nami.org/Learn-More/Mental-Health-Conditions 
[https://perma.cc/3WDK-6XJA]). 
156. See infra Section IV.B.1.
 157. See infra Section III.B.
 158. See infra Section IV.B.2.
159. See Olsen, supra note 7, at 1496. 
160.  U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 407 (2002) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
161.  See Olsen, supra note 7, at 1496. 
162.  See id.; see also Annie Decker, A Theory of Local Common Law, 35 CARDOZO 
REV. 1939, 1963 (2014) (“It is well known that the U.S. Supreme Court waits before L.
resolving federal circuit splits to let federal circuit courts of appeal take the first crack at 
the legal and policy questions.”).
163. See supra Section II.C.
 164. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 407 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
165. Id. at 406–07 (majority opinion). 
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as the only case to broach the subject of the interactive process, a number
of courts continue to rely on the Ninth Circuit’s approach.166 
Most notably, the Ninth Circuit included a “reason to know” standard 
before the 2008 amendments, when it stated: “In circumstances in which
an employee is unable to make such a request, if the company knows of 
the existence of the employee’s disability, the employer must assist in
initiating the interactive process.”167  In construing the ADA, the Ninth 
Circuit considered both a Senate report and the EEOC’s guidelines to 
examine the steps of the interactive process.168  In sum, the Ninth Circuit
held that employers who failed to engage in the interactive process should 
be held liable for a failure to accommodate, and that the question of 
whether the employer engaged in a good faith interaction may often be a 
factual question for the jury.169  This employer liability for failure to trigger
the interactive process is a critical device contributing to the employer’s
dilemma. 
After Barnett, the interactive process trigger remains unclear.  If anything,
the Barnett Court merely “created uncertainty” for employers “by rejecting a
categorical approach” that delineated specific employment policies that
would suffice under the ADA.170  Furthermore, because the Barnett decision
“created a more plaintiff-friendly approach . . . for addressing other types of 
employment policies,” an employer is far less likely to approach employees 
who have not explicitly asked for an accommodation.171  This fear of liability
hinders employers from engaging in the interactive process, and ADA-protected 
employees are thus not enjoying the full benefits of equal employment 
opportunities under the ADA.172 
166. See, e.g., Kowitz v. Trinity Health, 839 F.3d 742, 748 (8th Cir. 2016) (“Because 
there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Kowitz made a request for 
an accommodation sufficient to trigger Trinity’s duty to engage in the interactive process 
of identifying a reasonable accommodation, the judgment of the district court is reversed 
and remanded for further proceedings.”). 
167. Barnett v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated, 
535 U.S. 391 (2002). In contrast, for a typical ADA decision tree, which lacked any reason 
to know standard for employers before the 2008 amendment, see Gerald V. O’Brien & Christina 
Ellegood, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Decision Tree for Social Services Administrators, 
50 SOC. WORK 271, 273 tbl.1 (2005). 
168. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1114. 
169. Id. at 1116. 
170. Michelle Letourneau, Providing Plaintiffs with Tools: The Significance of EEOC v. 
United Airlines, Inc., 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1373, 1403 (2015). 
171. Id.
 172. See infra Section III.B.
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Perhaps what is most admirable—and most concerning—about the Ninth
Circuit’s Barnett analysis is the court’s policy exploration.173  Initially, the
court got it right when it stated that “[w]ithout the interactive process, many 
employers will be unable to identify effective reasonable accommodations.”174 
The court reasoned that without the threat of liability under failure to
accommodate claims for not engaging in the interactive process, “employers 
would have less incentive to engage in a cooperative dialogue and to explore 
fully the existence and feasibility of reasonable accommodations.”175 
The Ninth Circuit’s policy reasoning, however, may now be outdated.
Although this promulgation was perhaps quite accurate back in the early
2000s, the analysis does not hold up today because it neglects the 2008 
amendments’ expanded scope of regarded as employer liability.176  Today, 
employers are disincentivized from engaging in the interactive process when 
they may face liability for regarding an employee as mentally disabled.177 
Thus, due to congressional silence and sparse, outdated Supreme Court 
precedent, circuits are split on a variety of issues regarding the interactive 
process and reasonable accommodations.178  For example, circuits are split
on which circumstances the offering of a reassignment is a reasonable 
accommodation.179  The Seventh Circuit held that automatic reassignment 
may not be possible when the employer already has a most-qualified policy 
in place.180  In contrast, the Tenth Circuit recently held that failure to reassign
a disabled employee to a vacant position violates the ADA.181 
Circuits are also split on whether an employer must rescind a discharge 
if it later learns that an employee’s terminable behavior was due to a
mental disability.182  Although the EEOC regulations state that employers
do not need to rescind a discharge for an individual who violated a company 
173. See Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1116. 
174. Id.
 175. Id.
 176. See supra Section II.C.2. 
177. See supra Section II.C.2. 
178. For example, circuits are split on which circumstances the offering of a reassignment
is a reasonable accommodation.  Compare EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc. (United Airlines 
II), 693 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Assuming that the district court finds that mandatory 
reassignment is ordinarily reasonable, the district must then determine (under Barnett step 
two) if there are fact-specific considerations particular to United’s employment system that 
would create an undue hardship and render mandatory reassignment unreasonable.”), with 
EEOC v. TriCore Reference Labs., 849 F.3d 929, 938 n.8 (10th Cir. 2017) (“The EEOC’s 
view that TriCore admitted to a violation arises from both the text of the ADA and our case 
law.”). 
179. See Letourneau, supra note 170, at 1373. 
180. See id. at 1374. 
181. See TriCore Reference Labs., 849 F.3d at 938 n.8.
 182. See Hensel, supra note 7, at 83; see also Fierro, supra note 143, at 432–33. 
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policy as a result of a mental disability that needed an accommodation,183 
the EEOC’s regulations are not law.184  Nonetheless, without a discernible
framework delineated from Congress or the Supreme Court, most courts 
rely on the EEOC’s guidelines.185 
Finally, circuits are split as to whether an employer is put on constructive
notice of an employee’s disability and need of a reasonable accommodation
when the employee has not expressly communicated such a disability or
accommodation request.186  The Eighth Circuit, for example, “has not 
consistently held a uniform rule regarding what information an employer 
must have before it is obligated to engage in the interactive process.”187 
In contrast, as discussed above, the Ninth Circuit has implemented a reason 
to know standard for nearly two decades.188  This uncertainty around 
constructive notice is troubling because it does not afford employers 
an opportunity to engage in the interactive process and find reasonable 
accommodations for employees189 for fear of being held liable for regarded 
as discrimination.190 
This ambiguity also spills into other areas of dispute resolution.191  For
example, a recent study on ADA arbitration showed that 64% of arbitrators 
cited legal authority other than the ADA statute.192  Some arbitrators cited 
183. EEOC, EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 
ACT AND PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES question 31, ex. C (1997), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/
docs/psych.html [https://perma.cc/6LW7-D3YQ].
184. See Hensel, supra note 7, at 83.  Courts occasionally give EEOC regulations Chevron
deference, however, the regulations are not law. See id. at 83 n.77.  For a brief explanation 
of the varying levels of judicial deference granted to the EEOC, see infra Section III.C.2. 
 185. See Fierro, supra note 143, at 432.  The Seventh Circuit, for example, has held that
an employee is not afforded a “second chance to control a controllable disability.”  Id. 
 186. See Rachel S. Kim, Note, Help Me, Help You: Eighth Circuit Diminishes a Notice
Requirement for Employees Seeking an ADA Accommodation: Kowitz v. Trinity Health, 
839 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2016), 83 MO. L. REV. 409, 409–10, 417–18 (2018). 
187. Id. at 5409–10 (citing Craig A. Sullivan, The ADA’s Interactive Process, 57 J.
MO. B. 116, 118–119 (2001)). 
188. See Barnett v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated, 
535 U.S. 391 (2002). 
 189. See infra Section III.B.
 190. See supra Section II.C.2. 
191. See Stacy A. Hickox & Angela T. Hall, Arbitration of Claims for Accommodations: 
A Fair Resolution?, 52 U.S.F. L. REV. 31, 66 (2018). 
192.  Ariana R. Levinson, What the Awards Tell Us About Labor Arbitration of 
Employment-Discrimination Claims, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 789, 830 (2013). 
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case law, while others cited EEOC guidelines or treatises.193  Some arbitrated
decisions did not cite any legal authority whatsoever.194 
Without a clear trigger for the interactive process, employees are not
fully benefiting from the reasonable accommodations guaranteed to them 
by the ADA.195 Employers reasonably fear regarded as liability.196  As
discussed below, there are some simple ways that Congress can help both 
employees and employers with new legislation.197 
3. Current Statistics Show More Plaintiffs Are Filing ADA Claims 
In 2017, more than 35% of EEOC claims filed in California were based
on disability.198  In other words, disability claims have surpassed the amount
of “claims filed based on any other protected characteristic, including 
race, sex, color, religion, national origin, or age.”199  Another recent study
demonstrates that 59% of arbitrated claims decided in plaintiffs’ favor 
developed because the employer had failed to interact properly.200  Moreover,
plaintiffs continue to file regarded as ADA claims after employers believe 
the interactive process has been triggered and begin discussing reasonable 
accommodations with the employee.201 
193. Id.
 194. Id.
 195. See infra Section III.B.
 196. See supra Section II.C.2. 
197.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 198. See Kevin Rivera, Accommodating Attorneys, 41 L.A. LAW., Mar. 2018 at 20, 20. 
199.  Id.; see EEOC Charge Receipts by State (Includes U.S. Territories) and Basis 
for 2017, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/
enforcement/state_17.cfm [https://perma.cc/P4V7-NBZ4]. In California, the Department 
of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) also reported similar findings.  Rivera, supra 
note 198 (“[The DFEH] reported that the majority of employment-based discrimination 
claims it received in 2016 were based on disability.” (citing CAL. DEP’T FAIR EMP’T & HOUS., 
2016 ANNUAL REPORT (2017))). The EEOC may “utilize regional, State, local, and other 
agencies” to enforce equal employment laws.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(1) (2012).  In California, 
the EEOC and DFEH have a work-sharing agreement.  See State and Local Agencies, U.S. 
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/field/losangeles/fepa.cfm
[https://perma.cc/XF9F-HBLX].
The EEOC works with the Fair Employment Practice Agencies (FEPAs) and 
Tribal Employment Rights Offices (TEROs) to manage charges of discrimination 
and the protection of the employment rights of Native Americans.  The EEOC 
contracts with approximately 90 FEPAs nationwide to process more than 48,000 
discrimination charges annually.  These charges raise claims under state and local
laws prohibiting employment discrimination as well as the federal laws enforced
by the EEOC.
Id.
200.  Hickox & Hall, supra note 191, at 37. 
201. See, e.g., Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., No. 15 C 11540, 2019 WL 172760, at *1, 
*2–6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2019).  An employee filed suit for regarded as discrimination under 
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This upsurge in ADA claims shows how valuable amending the ADA 
would be to employees, employers, enforcement agencies, and judicial
economy.202  By clarifying what triggers the interactive process, employees
will have a better opportunity to be awarded a reasonable accommodation 
in the workplace.203  Additionally, employers will be explicitly notified 
that the employee is requesting a reasonable accommodation and will be 
uninhibited in discovering that accommodation without the in terrorem of 
regarded as liability.204  This approach will assure that employees receive 
reasonable accommodations without filing a lawsuit,205 which will promote 
judicial economy.206  Finally, enforcement agencies, such as the EEOC,
will be better able to enforce egregious ADA violations instead of simple 
misunderstandings.207 
B. Policy Goals Remain Unattainable Under the Current ADA 
Congress enacted Title I of the ADA to protect disabled individuals in 
the workplace.208  With its 2008 amendment, the ADA should be offering 
“unprecedented opportunities . . . [for] work in competitive integrated 
employment,”209 and a “new framework for equality.”210  The ADA aims
the ADA when employer requested employee to fill out disability leave request when plaintiff’s
psychiatrist rendered plaintiff “‘totally disabled’ and unable to work at the time” due to “major
depression” and anxiety. Id. at *2. 
202. See infra Section IV.B.
 203. See infra Section III.B.
 204. See supra Section II.C.2.
205.  See infra Section III.C.3. 
206. See infra Section IV.B.
 207. See infra Section III.C.2. 
208. Americans with Disabilities Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(1), (4), 122 
Stat. 3553, 3553 (2008) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012)) (“[I]n enacting
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Congress intended that the Act ‘provide a
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities’ and [to] provide broad coverage . . . . The holdings of the
Supreme Court . . . have narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded
by the ADA, thus eliminating protection for many individuals whom Congress intended 
to protect.”); see also Jennifer Mathis, The Importance of Framing Federal Mental Health
Policy Within a Disability Rights Framework, 42 HUM. RTS. 14, 14 (2017) (“[T]he Americans
with Disabilities Act . . . expand[s] opportunities for people with disabilities to participate 
as full members of society.”).
209. Mathis, supra note 208, at 14. 
210. Jamelia N. Morgan, One Not Like the Other: An Examination of the Use of the
Affirmative Action Analogy in Reasonable Accommodation Cases Under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 46 CAP. U. L. REV. 191, 192 (2018). 
 529
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to protect employees and applicants from “invidious discrimination.”211 
Under the ADA, employees have two powerful causes of action: one for 
traditional forms of discrimination and another for an employer’s failure 
to make reasonable accommodations.212  Additionally, some commentators
suggest that the regarded as prong helps ensure statutory protection for 
disabled as well as nondisabled individuals in the workplace.213 
However, these statutory protections only offer forms of legal recourse.214 
This means that disabled individuals might only enjoy the protections of 
the ADA when they file a lawsuit against an employer.215  This approach
is backward-looking and not forward-looking because it focuses on whether 
an employer has already violated the ADA.216  Instead, the ADA should focus
on ensuring statutory protection without needing to enter a courtroom.217 
Without this pivotal change, ADA-protected employees may continue to 
face discrimination or suffer from a lack of reasonable accommodations
and only find redemption after an employer’s violation.218  This statutory 
flaw is easily identified by the increase in ADA claims filed.219 
Furthermore, the high rates of unemployment for mentally disabled
individuals show that mentally disabled individuals are still not enjoying 
211. Elizabeth E. Aronson, Perceived-As Plaintiffs: Expanding Title VII Coverage to 
Discrimination Based on Erroneous Perception, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 235, 253 (2016).  
The ADA also protects against disparate treatment.  See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 
540 U.S. 44, 53 (2003).  However, this Comment is focused on balancing the need for 
reasonable accommodations with allegations of disparate treatment—not disparate impact.  
See supra Section II.C.  For an explanation of the interplay between disparate impact and 
reasonable accommodations, see generally Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation 
as Part and Parcel of the Antidiscrimination Project, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 861, 901–12 (2004). 
212. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2012).  The employer’s affirmative obligation to offer 
reasonable accommodations is comparable to affirmative action, in that employers must 
take steps to ensure workplace diversity.  Morgan, supra note 210, at 192–93. 
213. Aronson, supra note 211, at 255; Samuel Brown Petsonk & Anne Marie Lofaso, 
Working for Recovery: How the Americans with Disabilities Act and State Human Rights 
Laws Can Facilitate Successful Rehabilitation for Alcoholics and Drug Addicts, 120 W. 
VA. L. REV. 891, 903–04 (2018) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2012)). 
214. See Mary Crossley, Infected Judgment: Legal Responses to Physician Bias, 48 
VILL. L. REV. 195, 302 (2003) (“[A] civil rights enforcement approach . . . focuses—perhaps 
counterproductively—on backwards-looking ‘blaming and sanctioning’ rather than on moving 
forward to design systems that maximize the likelihood that [discrimination ceases].” (footnotes 
omitted)); Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Incomplete Law, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 931, 1012 (2003). 
215. See infra Section III.C.3. 
216. See infra Section III.C.3. 
217. See infra Section III.C.3. 
218. See infra Section III.C.3.  For a comparison of mental health law and disability
law, see Mathis, supra note 208, at 14–16. 
219. See supra Section III.A.3.
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the full and equal opportunities of the workplace.220  As of 2017, more than
60% of work-aged individuals with mental disabilities were unemployed.221 
These statistics hurt employees, employers, and the government’s budget.  
These unemployment rates hurt persons with mental disabilities who are 
seeking employment.222  They also undermine employers because turnover
and understaffing result in a “loss of productivity, earnings, and human 
potential.”223  Finally, these unemployment rates cost the country $25 billion 
in disability payments annually.224 
C. Previously Recommended Solutions Still Fall Short 
Scholars and practitioners have proposed a number of solutions to help 
protect mentally disabled employees under the ADA.225  However, these
solutions neglect the employer’s role in the interactive process and  cultivation 
of workplace dynamics.226  Additionally, some suggestions include placing 
more responsibility on the EEOC.227  However, the EEOC is an enforcement 
agency—not a legislative authority.228  Finally, the current proposed solutions
focus on legal recourse instead of ensuring ADA protections at the outset.229 
220. See Fierro, supra note 143, at 430. 
221. Id.
222. Unemployment can be debilitating for both disabled and nondisabled individuals
because “[w]ork in American society is a source of meaning and respect, and exclusion 
from work and productive activity undermines self-worth and reinforces devaluation and 
social stigma.”  David Mechanic, Cultural and Organizational Aspects of Application of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act to Persons with Psychiatric Disabilities, 76 MILBANK Q. 
5, 6 (1998). 
223. Fierro, supra note 143, at 430 (citing NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, THE HIGH 
COSTS OF CUTTING MENTAL HEALTH (2010), http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/1267826/
18732875/1339608141220/Unemployment.pdf? [https://perma.cc/822J-9263]).
224. Id.
 225. See infra Section III.C.1. 
226. See Sonya Smallets, Understanding Leaves: The Interaction Between Medical 
Leave Under FMLA/CFRA and Leaves of Absence as Reasonable Accommodation for a 
Disability Under FEHA, 43 S.F. ATT’Y, Winter 2017, at 54, 57.  Although the author focuses 
on California-specific employee rights, the author’s suggestion that the employer simply 
“do more” is still vague.  Id.  Employers can only do more when they know what more there is 
to do; employees should play a more dominant role in initiating the interactive process.  
See infra Section IV.B.1. 
227. See infra Section III.C.2. 
228. See infra Section IV.A.
 229. See infra Section III.C.3. 
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1. Other Approaches Fail to Clarify the Interactive Process’s Trigger 
Academics and practicing attorneys have taken some momentous first 
steps toward defining what should trigger the interactive process.  However, 
these suggestions have delved too far into complicated factors tests230 and 
public education ploys231 rather than simplifying the interactive process. 
Other recommended solutions, such as documenting meetings with employees, 
training management, and mediation, also fail to proactively protect mentally 
disabled employees.
Some commentators have suggested that a factors test232 might help
guide employers in determining whether the interactive process has been 
triggered.233  However, this approach just adds more facts to an already 
fact-intensive inquiry.234  Moreover, a factors test is a backward-looking 
approach; it presumes that litigation has already ensued.235  The goal of the
ADA, however, is not just to vindicate previously wronged employees.236 
The goal of the ADA is to protect disabled employees in the workplace 
without going to court.237 
Other commentators have recommended educating employers about
their responsibilities under the ADA.238  “Education” presumes, however,
that there is a concrete topic about which employers can be educated.  Currently, 
employer obligations under an interactive process are so complicated and 
contradictory that education cannot do the job; this approach depends on 
230. See, e.g., Fierro, supra note 143, at 425, 437 (suggesting a three-factor test for 
determining whether an employer should restore employment for an ADA-covered employee 
whose termination was due to behavior resulting from an unknown mental disability). 
231. See, e.g., Curtis D. Edmonds, Lowering the Threshold: How Far Has the Americans
with Disabilities Act Expanded Access to the Courts in Employment Litigation?, 26 J.L. & 
POL’Y 1, 27 (2018) (“[E]ducation about the ADAAA provisions for judges, practitioners, 
and plaintiffs is seriously warranted.”). 
232. Factors tests are commonly used in employment and labor law cases because 
the workplace varies tremendously from industry to industry, location to location, and manager 
to manager.  For example, courts use factors tests to determine whether a worker or volunteer 
worker is an employee covered under federal employment laws.  See, e.g., Juino v. Livingston 
Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 434–35 (5th Cir. 2013). 
233. See, e.g., Fierro, supra note 143, at 425. 
234. See Stanley Santire, The Road to Reasonable Accommodation in Dealing with 
Employees with Special Needs, 55 HOUS. LAW., Jan.–Feb. 2018, at 12, 12 (“For lawyers 
dealing with disability discrimination claims, the adventure is dealing with ADA rights and 
obligations and coping with challenging terms like ‘disability’ and ‘reasonable accommodation.’  
The clearest guide on that road is to keep in mind that just as each employee claiming a 
disability is a unique human being, the circumstances are different for each employer from 
whom an accommodation is claimed.”). 
235. See infra Section III.C.3. 
236. See supra Section II.B.
 237. See supra Section II.B.
238. See, e.g., Edmonds, supra note 231, at 27 (“[E]ducation about the ADAAA provisions
for judges, practitioners, and plaintiffs is seriously warranted.”). 
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an erroneous assumption that the ADA’s interactive process is a simple
process.239  Education and outreach are only effective when there are clear 
regulations and expectations in place.240  Before government agencies can
implement the educational approach, the interactive process trigger needs 
to be clarified.241 
Others suggest that employers document any interactions with employees 
to protect against potential lawsuits.  Without a statutory overhaul, 
documentation may be the best an employer can do.242  Failing to document
the stages of the interactive process, such as discussions about potential 
reasonable accommodations, is generally considered a “trap” among 
practitioners.243  Although this may be accurate, this Comment looks at what 
is best for both the employer, as well as the employee.  Additionally, an employer 
can only document the interactive process once it knows the process has 
been triggered.244 Instead, the best defense for employers, and the best course
of action for employees, would be to require a clear disclosure so that both 
parties know that the interactive process has been triggered.245 
239. See supra Section III.A.2.
240. Neither employees nor employers are mind readers.  Both need clear guidelines 
so that they know what is expected of them.  This is why employers, and not just employees, 
need clear guidance in the workplace, especially when any deviations may result in employer 
liability.  See  KEN BLANCHARD & GARRY RIDGE, HELPING PEOPLE WIN AT WORK: A 
BUSINESS PHILOSOPHY CALLED “DON’T MARK MY PAPER, HELP ME GET AN A” 97 (2009) 
(“All good performance starts with clear goals.  If people don’t know what they’re supposed to 
accomplish, how can they possibly [excel]?”). 
241. See infra Section IV.B.1.
 242. See, e.g., Maria Danaher, Employee’s Failure to Engage in Interactive Process 
Supports Dismissal of ADA Claim, EMP.L.MATTERS (May 15, 2017), https://www.employmentlaw 
matters.net/2017/05/articles/ada/employees-failure-actively-engage-interactive-process-
supports-dismissal-ada-claim/ [https://perma.cc/HWM6-3UGN] (“The instructive value 
of this opinion to employers is clear: the success of [the employer] in this case is based 
upon . . . documentation, which relied on job descriptions, statements from the [employer’s] 
HR department and [the employee’s] own unchanging statements regarding her concern 
over [essential job functions].”). 
243. See, e.g., Scott M. Abbott, Five ADA Traps for Employers to Avoid, 24 NEV.
LAW., Jan. 2016, at 12, 14 (“[D]ocumentation is an employer’s best defense to a ‘failure 
to accommodate’ complaint.”).  This article seems to suggest that employers are trying to 
get away with something and that documentation proves they engaged in the interactive 
process.  See id.  This Comment, in contrast, suggests that an employer’s “best defense” would 
be to follow the interactive process once the employee explicitly triggers the process.  See 
infra Section IV.B.1. 
244. See infra Section IV.B.1.
 245. See infra Section IV.B.1.
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Some previously proposed solutions involve implementing management
training to identify mental health disabilities and directing identified employees 
toward treatment.246  However, this approach risks regarded as liability.247 
For example, some employer-required tests allow employers to predict, 
often successfully, whether an employee has a mental disability.248 Yet, 
it is debatable whether employers are legally allowed to offer these tests 
to candidates as well.249  Additionally, post-offer screening may also lead 
to employer liability.250 
Other commentators have suggested mediation to help with the interactive
process.251  In fact, this approach might be an ideal guide for the interactive
process.252  For example, this approach will help ensure proper documentation.253 
Mediation is also very flexible, so it should give employers and employees 
ample opportunity to discover the best reasonable accommodation for 
each employee.254  However, mediation does not address what triggers the 
interactive process.255  This approach presumes that the interactive process 
246. See, e.g., Ballard & Henry, supra note 86, at 62. 
247. See supra Section II.C.2. 
248. See Hensel, supra note 7, at 92 (discussing the screening tests and the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) test). 
249. Id. at 92. For a 1992 argument in favor of employer testing, see David W. Arnold
and Alan J. Thiemann, To Test or Not to Test: The Status of Psychological Testing Under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 6 J. BUS. & PSYCHOL. 503, 503–06 (1992). 
250. See Hensel, supra note 7, at 93. 
251. See, e.g., Katheryn E. Miller, Mediating the Interactive Process, 46 COLO. LAW.,
May 2017, at 35, 37 (“Mediation is a uniquely suited interactive process that offers the 
parties optimal solutions.  Mediation as the interactive process can alleviate . . . difficulties 
to the benefit of all parties.”). 
252. See id. (“A trained third-party neutral facilitates the conversation, which emphasizes
sharing and clarifying information.  It is a flexible process where the parties can safely explore 
options to maximize outcomes.”). 
253. See id. at 38.  Mediation helps ensure documentation for a number of reasons: 
Through mediation, the interactive process will be well documented by the mediator.  
There will not be a question as to whether the interactive process occurred.  The process 
is designed to maximize the opportunity to find a reasonable accommodation that both the 
employer and the employee find to be reasonable.  The employer’s concerns about hardship 
can be vetted without fear of allegations of discrimination, and the employee can raise his 
or her fears, including those of retaliation, knowing that the concerns will be addressed. 
Id.
 254. See id. (“The process is flexible.  It should be approached in a collaborative 
manner.  How long it takes depends on the issues presented.  It can take a couple of hours, 
multiple sessions, or several months.  It depends on [the] availability of information and complexity 
of the issues.  The mediator can assist the employer to track and obtain missing information 
and set deadlines for moving through the process.”). 
255. Mediation presumes that a dispute already exists. See JENNIFER E. BEER & CAROLINE
C. PACKARD, THE MEDIATOR’S HANDBOOK 3 (rev. & expanded 4th ed. 2012).
534
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has already been triggered because mediation postulates that an issue or 
dispute is recognized by both opposing parties.256 
Thus, Congress should amend the ADA257 to ensure that ADA-protected
employees get the reasonable accommodations they need without jumping 
through hoops that could otherwise include: navigating intricate factors tests, 
meeting with management who lack adequate knowledge of the ADA, signing 
unnecessary paperwork just so that the company has “documentation,” being 
constantly studied by “trained” supervisors, or sitting through a mediation 
process after the employer has failed to offer the employee reasonable 
accommodations. 
2. The EEOC’s Limited Role 
Some commentators look to the original draft of the ADAAA to conclude 
that courts should defer to the EEOC’s guidance.258  This historical approach
recognizes that Congress created the EEOC, and enacted the ADA, to ensure 
a broad range of protection in the workplace.259  Although a court may give 
the EEOC’s guidelines considerable weight because Congress gave the 
256. Id.
 257. See infra Section IV.B.
 258. See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 7, at 1520.  “Congress could clarify that it did not
intend courts to defer to an employer’s judgment. . . . Congress could clarify its intent that 
the EEOC has authority to issue regulations with the force of law.”  Id. at 1514. 
259. See id. at 1520.  Congress was concerned that the foundations of the American
workplace excluded persons with disabilities: 
People with disabilities were measured against benchmarks of productivity.  The 
modern factory not only caused disabilities, but it mass-produced notions of
difference as inferior and impairments as damning. It is from this period that 
many modern conceptions of ideal or normal workers were drawn. Current
oppression of people with disabilities is thus connected all the way back to the 
birth of the modern American workplace.
Id. at 1521 (quoting Carrie Griffin Basas, Back Rooms, Board Rooms—Reasonable 
Accommodation and Resistance Under the ADA, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 59, 97 
(2008)). Successful employee stereotypes were centered only around persons without
disabilities:
Indeed, the ideal worker is one who performs the job in the precise way that the
employer has mandated, even if there are other ways of accomplishing this task
that do not impose an undue hardship on the employer.  But this ideal worker is
the very norm the ADA intended to challenge. 
Id. at 1521–22. 
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agency the authority to issue regulations implementing the ADA, courts
are actually not bound by any EEOC guidelines.260 
Granting judicial deference may give the EEOC more autonomy over 
the enforcement process.261  However, this approach disregards the fact that
the EEOC already has limited resources and that a shift in enforcement 
practices may overwhelm the agency.262  As some authors note, the EEOC 
already has limited resources.263 Instead, the EEOC should remain an 
enforcement agency.264  The agency is not intended to be a legislative body 
or an extension of the judicial branch.265 
Allowing the EEOC to stay focused on enforcement, rather than legislation, 
will better maintain the integrity of the ADA.266  Encouraging disclosure
by requiring it as an element in failure to accommodate claims better conserves 
government resources and promotes judicial economy.267  In other words,
this scheme allows the EEOC to allocate its resources to compel compliance 
only against intentional failures to accommodate.268  Additionally, this 
260. See Ballard & Henry, supra note 86, at 35.  Courts occasionally give the EEOC
Chevron deference.  See, e.g., Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 
573 (4th Cir. 2015) (giving deference to EEOC’s inclusion of interacting with others as a 
major life activities on its regulatory list).  For an in-depth look at varying levels of judicial 
deference, see Eric Dreiband & Blake Pulliam, Deference to EEOC Rulemaking and Sub-
Regulatory Guidance: A Flip of the Coin?, 32 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. LAW 93, 94–98 (2016). 
261. Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Less Is More: Procedural Efficacy in Vindicating Civil
Rights, 68 ALA. L. REV. 49, 61 (2016) (“On one hand, substituting administrative enforcement 
for judicial enforcement gives the agency control over the claims and issues pursued.”). 
262. Id. at 62 (“Or they may all make the same choice—for example, if everyone 
chooses an administrative remedy over a judicial remedy, disastrous consequences may 
ensue if the agency is not equipped to handle every claim.  Moreover, if claimants are not 
forced to choose, and instead are allowed to pursue simultaneous administrative and judicial 
remedies, serious questions arise regarding the efficiency and wastefulness of duplicative 
enforcement actions.”).
263. See Hickox & Hall, supra note 191, at 62 (describing the EEOC as having very
limited resources); Shinall, supra note 261, at 52 (“The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), the federal agency in charge of administering employment discrimination 
charges, is notoriously underfunded, [which] result[s] in a backlog of cases, long wait times for 
charge investigation, and fewer resources for the agency to litigate claims in the public 
interest.”). 
264. Shinall, supra note 261, at 59 (“Most of the scholarly concerns raised regarding
the agency, however, are structural in nature.  These arguments contend that even if Congress 
were more generous with the EEOC’s funding, fundamental flaws would remain in the design 
of employment discrimination law enforcement.”). 
265. See id. at 60 (“Many scholars have lamented the EEOC’s lack of adjudicative 
authority, but how much adjudicative authority the agency should have remains a source 
of debate.”). 
266. See supra Section III.B.
 267. See infra Section IV.B.1. For a brief explanation of the EEOC’s involvement
in ADA claims, see also Kristi Bleyer, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Enforcement 
Mechanisms, 16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 347, 347–48 (1992). 
268. See supra Section III.B.
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approach would streamline cases because it reduces the number of causes
of action that a plaintiff, or the EEOC, may file.269 
3. Proactive Versus Reactive Solutions
Finally, the biggest problem with the ambiguous trigger of the interactive
process and its previously proposed solutions is that the current legal 
mechanisms in place are reactive and not proactive measures.270  Courts
are generally seen as “holders of residual lawmaking and reactive law 
enforcement powers.”271  In response to gaps in statutory law, legislatures 
may direct enforcement agencies and regulators to issue their own guidelines.272 
Although this approach helps patch the holes in the legal framework, it is
still not proactive law because enforcement agencies do just that—enforce. 
Enforcing a law is reactive.273  Proactive law focuses on guaranteeing statutorily 
protected rights without going to court.274  Proactive law encourages clear 
regulations that are easy to follow so that all parties involved preserve 
statutorily protected rights.275 
To better effectuate the policy goals of the ADA,276 Congress should 
include disclosure as an element of failure to accommodate claims.277  By
requiring disclosure as an element, employees must have disclosed to their 
employer that they have a disability before they can bring failure to 
accommodate claims.278  By requiring disclosure as an element during the
269. Generally, claim preclusion promotes judicial economy. See Mitchell N. Berman,
Note, Removal and the Eleventh Amendment: The Case for District Court Remand Discretion 
To Avoid a Bifurcated Suit, 92 MICH. L. REV. 683, 715 n.186 (1993). 
270. See generally Pistor & Xu, supra note 214. 
271. Id. at 1012. 
272. See id. at 932.  “[A] law [is] complete if a law enacted today unambiguously
stipulates for all future contingencies; otherwise a law is incomplete.”  Id.  Legislatures may 
draft “incomplete law” for a variety of reasons, including bad drafting, inability to adapt 
to socioeconomic and technological advancements, the existence of other previously enacted 
laws, or a lack of resources.  Id. at 932–33. 
273. See id. at 935 (“Courts are designed to be reactive law enforcers.”).
274. Id.
 275. See id.  Proactive law can be issued by regulators.  Id.
 276. See supra Section III.B.
 277. See infra Section IV.B.1.
278. Currently, plaintiffs are not required to show that they have disclosed mental 
disabilities to their employers in failure to accommodate claims.  See supra Section II.C.1.  
Instead, a plaintiff may let the jury draw an inference that the employer had a reason to 
know that the plaintiff had a mental disability that requires a reasonable accommodation.  
See supra Section II.C.1. 
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trial—the reactive phase of the ADA—employees will disclose and explicitly 
trigger the interactive process far before going to court—during the proactive 
phase of the ADA.  Thus, in the best case scenario, trial would be avoided 
because employers have an opportunity to accommodate their employee.
Additionally, discouraging regarded as claims filed alongside failure to 
accommodate claims will coax employers to engage in the interactive process 
in good faith for as long as necessary to find a reasonable accommodation 
for employees.279  By adjusting the elements in failure to accommodate
claims, the ADA becomes a more proactive law, and protects employees 
without entering the courtroom.280 
In sum, today’s employers are increasingly more likely to hire an ADA-
protected employee and then find themselves hesitant to offer reasonable
accommodations without a clear trigger from employees.281  Employees
are increasingly bringing both failure to accommodate and regarded as 
discrimination claims.282  Unfortunately, these trends show that employees
are still dissatisfied with their employment opportunities under the ADA 
because they have not received the reasonable accommodations that they
need to be successful.283  Alternatively, they have been discriminated against
when an employer concludes they may have a disability for fear of liability 
for failing to offer reasonable accommodations.284  The fact that plaintiffs
are bringing either of these claims to court shows that ADA-protected 
employees are still not receiving the full benefits of equal opportunities in 
the workplace.285  This result frustrates the purpose of the ADA and leaves
employees with only reactive solutions for vindication.  It is time for 
Congress to amend the ADA with today’s trends in mind. 
IV. PROPOSALS: CONGRESS SHOULD REQUIRE EXPLICIT EMPLOYEE 
DISCLOSURE TO TRIGGER THE INTERACTIVE PROCESS 
AND LIMIT ALTERNATIVE PLEADING
IN ADA CLAIMS 
Congress should amend the ADA in two ways.  First, failure to accommodate 
claims should require employees to have explicitly disclosed a mental 
disability to the employer.286  Second, Congress should disallow regarded 
279. See infra Section IV.B.2.
 280. See Pistor & Xu, supra note 214, at 935. 
281. See supra Section III.A. 
282. See supra Sections III.A.3, II.C.2.
 283. See supra Sections III.A.3, II.C.1. 
284. See supra Sections III.A.3, II.C.2. 
285. See supra Section III.B.
 286. See infra Section IV.B.1.
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as discrimination claims to be alternatively pleaded with failure to
accommodate claims.287 
A. Congressional Leadership 
Congress should pass legislation that helps promote disclosure because
federal law is a uniform way to guarantee equal rights in the workplace 
for mentally disabled employees.288  Additionally, legislating is Congress’s 
job; lawmaking is not an enforcement agency’s job.289  Writing the 
amendment will do more than create law—it will create policy.290  Thus,
Congress needs to take a role in the ADA amendment process because 
Congress’s job is to “mak[e] good policy for the nation.”291  Furthermore, 
because the ADA includes rather ambitious policy goals, Congress should 
take responsibility for amending the ADA.292 
Although the 2008 amendments have furthered the ADA’s policy goals 
of offering mentally disabled employees legal protections in the workplace,293 
those protections are only leveraged after a failure to accommodate or
postdiscrimination.294  With the influx of mental disability diagnoses, the
likelihood that an employer will employ a person with a mental disability 
is very high.295 Thus, Congress should furnish employers with the tools they
need to ensure their employees enjoy equal opportunities in the workplace. 
B. Proposed ADA Amendments 
Congress can make two simple adjustments to the ADA.  First, Congress 
should amend the ADA to require employee disclosure as an element in
failure to accommodate claims.  Disclosure would thus explicitly trigger 
the interactive process and give employers an opportunity to find a reasonable 
287. See infra Section IV.B.2.
 288. See Long, Divergent Interpretations, supra note 46, at 478 (“In short, federal 
law has traditionally set the standard for individual rights in the employment context, with 
state legislatures and courts taking their cues from federal law.”). 
289. See Hanah Metchis Volokh, A Read-the-Bill Rule for Congress, 76 MO. L. REV. 
135, 139 (2011) (“Lawmaking is the most primary, fundamental part of a legislator’s job.”). 
290. See id. at 140–41.  “A responsible legislator must learn both [policymaking and 
lawmaking].”  Id. at 141. 
291. Id. at 143. 
292. See id.
 293. See supra Sections II.A.2, III.B. 
294.  See supra Section III.C.3. 
295. See supra Section III.A.1. 
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accommodation for their employees instead of learning about a disability 
upon the filing of a lawsuit. Although this type of approach may infringe 
on privacy law,296 the ADA’s policy goals of guaranteeing employee
workplace opportunities far outweigh any such concerns.297 
Second, Congress should limit alternative pleading in failure to accommodate 
claims so as to bar pleading both regarded as discrimination and failure to 
accommodate causes of action.  This amendment will encourage employers 
to engage in the interactive process and guarantee reasonable accommodations 
for employees without entering a courtroom.298  Additionally, encouraging
disclosure by barring regarded as claims may help diffuse stigma about 
mental disabilities because so much of the population is or will be diagnosed 
with a mental disability within their lifetimes.299  Congress should encourage
the employee to play a larger role in requests for accommodation by requiring 
employee disclosure that triggers the interactive process.300 
1. Employee Disclosure of Disability Should Be an Element of  
Failure to Accommodate Claims 
Granted, requiring disclosure of a mental disability diagnosis, its symptoms,
and treatment, threatens privacy law.301  However, encouraging disclosure
would not infringe on privacy rights.  Congress can encourage disclosure 
by requiring disclosure as an element in failure to accommodate claims.  
This means that employees are not required to divulge a mental diagnosis 
if they choose; however, they would be unable to sue an employer for failure 
to accommodate.  Disclosure here is meant to facilitate the interactive process 
and ensure that mentally disabled employees get the reasonable accommodations 
that they need and deserve under the ADA.302  Encouraging disclosure will
296. See Jennifer Mathis, Mental Health Privacy: Do Inquiring Minds Really Need 
to Know?, 41 HUM. RTS. 10, 10 (2016). 
297. The majority of public policy cases compare “the private arrangement of citizens as 
equal to public arrangements and tries to strike a balance between the two.” Farshad 
Ghodoosi, The Concept of Public Policy in Law: Revisiting the Role of the Public Policy 
Doctrine in the Enforcement of Private Legal Arrangements, 94 NEB. L. REV. 685, 689 
(2016). 
298. See supra Section III.C.3. 
299. This Comment disagrees with the suggestion that sharing medical information 
with decision-makers “perpetuate[s] prejudice and deter[s] individuals from seeking help.”  
Mathis, supra note 208, at 10. 
300. See infra Section IV.B.1.
 301. See Mathis, supra note 208, at 10 (“The last several years have brought an 
unusual number of public calls to change privacy rules to permit or require greater disclosure 
of individuals’ mental health information—including details about their symptoms, diagnoses, 
history, and/or treatment.”). 
302. This Comment does not address any link between mental disability and violence,
nor does it contest the premise that disclosure fails to facilitate safer work environments.  
540
KAGAN_57-2 5-26-2020 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/26/2020 9:35 AM      
 







   
     
 
 




    
[VOL. 57:  501, 2020] To Trigger or Not to Trigger 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
help make employees with mental disabilities part of the solution—not
part of the problem.303 
Persons with mental disabilities may not realize how failing to disclose 
a medical condition actually impairs their job performance and career 
opportunities.304  When an employer already presumes an employee’s 
underperformance is not medically related, an employer may be less inclined 
to initiate any dialogue about improving job performance.305  This inhibits
career development and infringes upon crucial professional relationships 
that lead to advancement in the workplace.306  Disclosure will also help
prevent employers from perceiving an employee’s disability as a disingenuous 
See Mathis, supra note 208, at 11.  Admittedly, there may be occasions when persons with
disabilities may instigate workplace violence—but this is rarely because of the disability:
[R]ecent proposals to permit or require greater scrutiny of individuals’ mental 
health information are poorly suited to accomplish their asserted goal of preventing 
violent or dangerous conduct.  Studies have shown repeatedly that mental illness 
is a very poor predictor of future violence.  Indeed, only about four percent of 
violence is attributable to individuals with mental illness, and even in those rare 
instances when such individuals do engage in violence, it is frequently other risk 
factors, such as co-occurring substance use disorders, rather than the symptoms 
of mental illness, that cause the conduct. 
Id.  Rather, this Comment focuses on leveraging disclosure as a way to unequivocally 
trigger the interactive process and help mentally disabled employees get the reasonable
accommodations that they need to be successful in the workplace.  See supra Section III.C.3.
303. See Hensel, supra note 7, at 102 (“It is conventional wisdom that the easiest 
kind of value to see is the kind you are used to seeing.  By taking a broader perspective and 
recognizing the value in employees who think and approach problem solving differently, 
employers will simultaneously benefit themselves and people with [autism spectrum 
disorder (ASD)].”).
304. Miller, supra note 251, at 37. Failing to request a reasonable accommodation 
can hurt an employee’s career prospects:
Employees often lack understanding and awareness of their rights.  Fear of retaliation 
or stigma deters requests for accommodation.  Although medical conditions are 
entitled to confidentiality, breach of confidentiality is common, and anxiety can 
exist over perceived or actual hostility from supervisors and coworkers.  Although 
delay in treatment and accommodation can lead to a decline in condition, job 
performance, and work relationships, this is often exactly what happens.  Employee 
advocates wait too long to get involved. 
Id.
 305. See id. (“All of these circumstances can erode trust and lead to deterioration in 
the supervisor-employee relationship.  As the situation spirals downward, the options for 
finding a reasonable accommodation dissipate.  Positions harden and personal resentment 
grows on both sides.”). 
306. See id. (“The employee may end up blaming the company or the supervisor, while
the company ends up wanting to get rid of the ‘problem employee.’”). 
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excuse, rather than a legitimate mental disability covered under the ADA.307 
Furthermore, these barriers may actually aggravate an employee’s existing
condition.308 
Currently, the ADA’s disclosure requirements are quite limited.309 
Employers can only ask about disabilities and diagnoses once a job offer
has been extended, and those inquiries are limited to whether the candidate
can perform the essential functions of the job.310  Additionally, the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA) only authorizes 
disclosure in extremely limited situations, such as in emergencies.311 
Furthermore, requiring disclosure to plead failure to accommodate may
actually help ensure a diverse workforce and reduce negative stigmas about 
mentally disabled employees.312  By teaching employees about tolerance, 
307. See Steve Metzger & Nancy Leonard, The Americans with Disabilities Act After 
a Quarter Century, 34 ACC DOCKET 46, 49–50 (2016).  Persons with disabilities can protect 
their work reputations by disclosing early: 
Employees who cannot find it in themselves to report to work and perform their
jobs in a minimally satisfactory manner will go to great lengths to protect themselves
from the consequences of their behavior.  Notably, if some of those employees 
devoted the same kind of energy and attention to coming to work and doing their
jobs, they would[] [not] be on the progressive discipline track in the first place.
One such method of self-preservation involves a sudden announcement by the
employee that he has a medical condition, usually of a psychological or emotional
nature, that was, to that point, unknown to the employer and often to the employee
himself. The announcement usually comes toward the end of the progressive 
discipline process and, sometimes, even after the employee has been advised of his 
impending termination. The employee has now cloaked himself with the protections
of the ADA in an effort to stop the termination.  The employee sometimes will 
point to the alleged medical condition as the cause of the poor performance or
unacceptable behavior.  Often, though, the employee merely makes the announcement
in the hope that the existence of a disability will be enough to stop the termination.
The play sounds something like this—“I was on step four of the progressive 
disciplinary policy and the next step was termination.  I told Big Company that I
had post traumatic stress disorder and that my inappropriate behavior toward
my supervisor was caused by the condition.  Two days later I was fired.  I was
fired because I told Big Company that I had a disability.” 
Id.
 308. Miller, supra note 251, at 37 (“As stress increases, the employee’s medical condition
can worsen, further complicating the situation.”). 
309. See Mathis, supra note 208, at 12 (“The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 
HIPAA, and other laws already provide sufficient latitude for employers, licensing bodies, 
families, and regulators to review individuals’ mental health information in situations where it 
is actually relevant.”). 
310. Id.
 311. See id.
 312. See Hensel, supra note 7, at 101–02 (“There is no question that the next decade 
will see increasing numbers of individuals with ASD applying for jobs and working in the 
labor force.  Whether or not they experience success will be highly dependent on the actions of
employers and their compliance with federal anti-discrimination laws.  Employers must
structure the hiring and interview process to eliminate unnecessary barriers to people with
542
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employers would play a vital role in promoting the ADA’s policy goals 
of ensuring equal opportunities in the workplace, as well as leverage a 
best practice.313 
Moreover, maintaining confidentiality may actually hurt an employee’s 
or applicant’s integration into the workplace.314  Although not necessary 
under this Comment’s proposed solution, keeping coworkers involved in 
the reasonable accommodation process may actually lead to better acceptance 
and equality in the workplace.315  This is because “[p]eople usually are more 
receptive to an idea if they contributed to its development.”316 This
collaborative approach will lead to more open communication between 
colleagues.317 Furthermore, this approach would likely result in increased 
employee satisfaction and higher productivity.318 
autism that are unrelated to the position in question.  The law requires employers to engage
in an interactive process and provide the reasonable accommodations that are necessary to 
enable these workers to succeed. Employers also must carefully consider how to structure
the workplace environment to enable employees with autism to meet conduct rules and
expectations.  In light of the more expansive definition of disability under the ADAAA,
employers who ignore such mandates will be exposed to legal liability in the future.  It
is critical to recognize that employers’ legal compliance in this regard has the potential to
benefit both employees with ASD and their employers. Individuals with ASD bring very
real strengths to the table and have the potential to be significant assets to employers who 
invest in their training and development. . . . Hiring this population may also lead to increased 
business and goodwill from consumers.  One study found that almost all consumers would
‘prefer to give their business to companies that employ people with disabilities.’” (citing
Gary N. Siperstein et al., A National Survey of Consumer Attitudes Toward Companies 
that Hire People with Disabilities, 24 J. VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION 3, 6 (2006))). 
313. See id. at 97. 
314. Rose A. Daly-Rooney, Designing Reasonable Accommodations Through Co-Worker
Participation: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Confidentiality Provision of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 89, 90 (1993). 
315. Id. at 92. 
316. Id. at 100. 
317. Id. at 102. 
318. See Porter, supra note 48, at 262–63 (“Although this next finding is fairly
obvious, it still bears mentioning.  The study found that employees who had their 
accommodations granted had better attitudes about the workplace.  They had higher
perceptions of organizational support and higher job satisfaction.  Furthermore, granting 
accommodations seemed to have a positive spillover effect on other employees.  Both 
employees with and without disabilities reported various positive effects because of 
accommodations given.  Almost half of both groups of employees reported that the
accommodations have improved the employees’ interactions with coworkers.  Other benefits
reported included improved productivity, greater employee retention, improved morale
and job satisfaction, decreased employee stress at work, improved employee attendance, 
improved workplace safety, improved employee ability to acquire training or new skills,
and greater ability for the company to promote a qualified employee.” (footnotes omitted)).
 543





















     
       
Many academics consider a candidate or employee’s voluntary disclosure
of any disability to be disadvantageous,319 which stems from disability
bias in the United States and may be “particularly true for individuals with 
mental impairments, given the strong history of stigma against this group.”320 
As a result, many persons with disabilities refrain from any disclosure.321 
However, this Comment’s proposed solution puts the employer on notice 
and shifts the employer’s focus from wondering whether an employee is 
disabled and in need of an accommodation to proactively interacting with
the employee and doing what is best for the employee.322  Engaging in the
interactive process early on is an economically efficient approach to ensuring 
workplace equality.323  This approach should alleviate any additional stress 
the employee may bear and shift the burden of initiating the interactive 
process to the employer.324  Furthermore, this approach will also usher in 
an era of stronger tolerance for fellow employees.325 
Additionally, reducing mental health privacy will actually help employees
attain greater autonomy in the workplace because it will put employers on 
notice and explicitly trigger the interactive process.326  Some authors suggest
that the current burdens associated with ADA claims put employees on trial 
twice.327  However, requiring disclosure may actually reduce the number
319. E.g., Hensel, supra note 7, at 87. 
320. Id. 
321. See generally id. at 89. 
322. See id. at 88 (suggesting that disclosure helps explain an autistic candidate’s 
“patchwork quilt” résumé).  “In light of this reality, employers in many respects are better 
off if the employee discloses upfront.  With disclosure, the focus more quickly moves from 
an emphasis on disability to one of ability.”  Id. at 90. 
323. See Olsen, supra note 7, at 1518 (“[T]his approach could avoid the expense and
time involved in litigation over failure to accommodate claims, even if the employer would 
ultimately prevail on summary judgment.” (citing Amy Knapp, Comment, The Danger of 
the “Essential Functions” Requirement of the ADA: Why the Interactive Process Should Be 
Mandated, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 715, 728 (2013))). 
324. See id. at 1518–19 (“Thus, both from an employer’s perspective and with the 
goal of reaching the reasonable accommodation analysis, the reasonable accommodation 
requirement should be an earlier and more robust process.  That is, constructive knowledge 
should be sufficient to initiate the duty to reasonably accommodate.”). 
325. See id. at 1519 (“[S]ensitivities towards the disabled community in the workplace 
must change.  The purpose of the ADA and the ADAAA is to emphasize that an individual’s 
right to participate in society does not diminish simply by virtue of her disabilities.”). 
326. But see Mathis, supra note 296, at 13 (“Reducing mental health privacy helps no 
one.”). 
327. See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 7, at 1498 (“First, the employee caries the burden of
proving she is qualified.  Second, courts defer to the employer’s judgment as to the employee’s 
qualified status.  This process puts the plaintiff’s disabled status on trial for a second time—the 
first being the court’s determination of whether she is indeed disabled—which frustrates 
congressional intent to create broad protections for people with disabilities.”); see also 
Santire, supra note 234, at 13 (“Beyond showing proof of disability, the employee, or the 
applicant for employment, must show qualification for the job regardless of the impairment.  
544
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of plaintiffs that need to endure that two-step trial because it will give 
employers an opportunity to engage in the interactive process and find a
reasonable accommodation for the employee.  Thus, with a reasonable
accommodation, an ADA-protected employee will be better positioned to
meet—or exceed—expectations and enjoy a flourishing career.328 
Moreover, disclosure may actually promote a fundamental principle of
public interest law: “Representation of the unrepresented and the 
underrepresented.”329  This principle is only observed when law protects 
a minority’s statutorily protected rights.330  Thus, the ADA’s goals are
actually to guarantee the rights of persons with mental disabilities—not to 
compensate those individuals retroactively for having suffered discrimination.331 
Furthermore, disclosure aligns with a common perception of justice: the 
“justice as fairness” theory.332 The justice as fairness theory focuses on how
a diverse community “decide[s] once and for all what is to count among 
This is a two-step process.  First, the individual must have the requisite skill, experience, 
education and other requirements for the relevant job. . . . [T]he second step is to prove or
demonstrate an ability to perform the essential job functions with or without reasonable 
accommodation.”).
328. A job is not the same as a career.  Rather, a career is a series of jobs that is personally
rewarding, involves development and not just training, and “require[s] a high degree of 
commitment.”  Joy E. Pixley, Differentiating Careers from Jobs in the Search for Dual-
Career Couples, 52 SOC. PERSP. 363, 364 (2009).  Additionally, because employers benefit 
from long-term employees and low turnover, a pique in organizational behavior has led to 
increased interest in “job design theory.”  Job design theory aims to create “stimulating 
jobs [that] are associated with motivating psychological states that contribute to favorable 
attitudinal and behavior work outcomes.”  Yitzhak Fried et al., Job Design in Temporal Context: 
A Career Dynamics Perspective, 28 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 911, 911 (2007). For an
examination of typical career paths, see generally Rachel A. Rosenfeld, Job Mobility and 
Career Processes, 18 ANN. REV. SOC. 39 (1992).  A key reason to differentiate between jobs
and careers is that careers are associated with more pay. See Pixley, supra (“Careers [are]
also seen as offering high levels of extrinsic rewards, especially income.”).  Higher pay is
important here because the ADA aims to give mentally disabled individuals economic
independence.  See Wendy E. Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures: Judicial
Interpretations of the Meaning of Disability, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 53, 53 (2000)
(“Central to [the legislature’s] enthusiasm was a belief that the new Act would promote 
the independence and economic self-sufficiency of millions of people with disabilities.”). 
329. David R. Esquivel, Note, The Identity Crisis in Public Interest Law, 46 DUKE 
L.J. 327, 328 (1996). 
330. See id. (“Representation involved the defense of another’s interests.”). 
331. See id. at 329 (“[P]rocedure-based conceptions of justice fail to provide an adequate
framework for public interest law because the pursuit of a substantively better society is an 
essential component of any movement for legal reform or enforcement of pre-existing rights.”). 
332. Id. at 330. 
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them as just and unjust.”333  This collaborative approach mirrors the democratic 
processes required for community buy-in334 in a diverse society.335  Thus, 
public interest law suggests achieving equal opportunity in the workplace 
requires a collaborative approach that endorses employee disclosure.336 
Moreover, this approach will ensure that employees see the proactive benefits 
of the ADA—receiving reasonable accommodations—rather than defaulting
to the ADA’s reactive solutions—heading to court. 
2. Failure to Accommodate Claims Should Not Be Alternatively 
Pleaded with Regarded As Claims 
Employee disclosure could actually be disadvantageous for an employer
—not an employee.337  This is because an “[e]mployers’ early knowledge
of disability, particularly one linked to interpersonal deficits, strengthens 
the ability of the applicant to qualify for class membership under the 
‘regarded as’ prong of the ADA should litigation ensue.”338  This is particularly
troubling because even without disclosure or accommodation request, courts 
have found that an employee’s “odd” behavior “was sufficient to give notice 
of an individual’s disability and need for accommodation.”339 
Thus, a congressional bar against pleading both a failure to accommodate
claim and a regarded as discrimination claim will promote judicial economy.340 
In other words, disclosure will explicitly trigger the interactive process and
make the issue of whether the employer knew or should have known about 
the employee’s mental disability easier to investigate, which will help eliminate 
frivolous claims at summary judgment.341  Moreover, this approach undermines
333. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 207 (1971). For a brief discussion of John
Rawls’s potential influence on modern political theory, see also Brooke Ackerly, John Rawls: 
An Introduction, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 75, 75–78 (2006). 
334. Effective management requires employee buy-in. See John Adler & Jay Youngdahl, 
The Odd Couple: Wall Street, Union Benefits, and the Looting of the American Worker, 
19 NEW LAB. F. 80, 84 (2010) (“An effective organizational structure—with buy-in across 
the labor movement—must be developed, which clarifies the true effects of labor’s present 
activity . . . .”). 
335. See Esquivel, supra note 329, at 331. 
336. For a brief history of equal opportunity laws in the United States, see Joshua E. 
Weishart, Transcending Equality Versus Adequacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. 477, 485–89 (2014). 
337. See Hensel, supra note 7, at 89. 
338. Id.
 339. Id. “This may be a particularly persuasive argument in cases in which the employee’s
disorder affect her ability to engage in meaningful communication.”  Id. 
340. For a closer look at the interplay of judicial economy and the floodgates argument,
see generally Toby J. Stern, Comment, Federal Judges and Fearing the “Floodgates of 
Litigation,” 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 377, 377–79, 420–21 (2003). 
341. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 315 
(1999) (“Today’s caseloads make it a question of some moment whether judges legitimately 
may consider caseload effects when deciding a case.”). 
546
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any “floodgates” argument because this statutory change would not establish 
a new right, it would only change the way a right is enforced.342 
In sum, if employees learn that they are unable to alternatively plead both 
failure to accommodate and regarded as claims, they may feel compelled 
to take action in the workplace and speak to the employer rather than waiting
for litigation to remediate their ADA-protected rights to reasonable 
accommodations.  As more mentally disabled employees join the workforce,
Congress should give employers the tools they need to best accommodate 
their new employees. Otherwise, the ADA, nearly thirty years old, is still 
ineffective. Without these minor, imperative adjustments to the ADA,
employees will only find redemption retroactively—through litigation—and 
remain unable to enjoy the benefits of reasonable accommodations in the 
workplace. 
V. CONCLUSION
Title I of the ADA imposes an ambiguous interactive process on employers
because it does not put forth an explicit trigger.  Because an employer may
face liability for failing to engage in the interactive process when it has a 
reason to know that a mentally disabled employee needs a reasonable 
accommodation, but may also face liability for regarding an employee as 
disabled, employers are currently ensnared in an inescapable catch-22. 
In considering mental, as opposed to physical, disabilities, this predicament
often leaves employers unprepared or unwilling to help these employees 
because mental disabilities are not always obvious.  An employer is less 
likely to initiate the interactive process if it can be held liable for regarding 
an employee as disabled when it triggers the interactive process.  Because
a number of mental disabilities are not easily identifiable or communicable,
many employees are unable to benefit from the employer’s affirmative duty 
to engage in the interactive process when an employer fears liability under
the regarded as prong of the ADA.  Unfortunately, this means that as the
number of mental diagnoses steadily increases, employers will face inescapable 
liability, and the ADA will continue failing to protect mentally disabled
employees.
Employers need better tools to help mentally disabled employees.  This 
Comment strives to raise awareness around the ADA’s ambiguous interactive
342. Stern, supra note 340, at 385–86 (“Thus the floodgates argument can appear in
many types of cases[] but tends to recur in those cases where a litigant seeks to establish 
a new right or cause of action.”). 
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process and proposes that Congress should require employee disclosure
as an element in failure to accommodate claims.  Additionally, Congress
should bar the pleading of both failure to accommodate and regarded as 
discrimination in the same suit.  These changes will finally eliminate the
catch-22 and help achieve the important policy goals that the ADA set out 
to accomplish: equal opportunity for our colleagues with mental disabilities. 
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